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The research on the return to education is one of the largest branches of
literature in labor economics. In the labor market, education can improve
individual’s wage rate and income (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Card, 1999, 2001;
Oreopoulos et al., 2006). Outside the labor market, education may also affect
people’s life outcomes such as health, marriage and fertility (Oreopoulos and
Salvanes, 2011; Grossman, 2006). My thesis consists of three chapters, which
explore the effects of education on fertility, marriage, and trust respectively.
Chapter 1 estimates the effect of female education on fertility. An extensive
body of literature documents a negative correlation between female education
and fertility, particularly between female education and teenage births. How-
ever, whether this correlation represents a causal relationship is still inconclu-
sive. This chapter adds to this literature by exploiting the exogenous variation
in female education in the UK induced by the raising of school leaving age in
1972. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design, we find that a one year
increase in female schooling reduces teenage birth rate by about 7 percentage
points. This is mainly caused by the reduction in births at ages 18 to 20.
Since they have already passed the legal school leaving age of 16, the reduc-
tion is unlikely due to the “incarceration effect” (Black et al., 2008). Besides,
viii
the reduction in teenage births may be driven by the delay in the timing of
marriage, as we find that a one year increase in schooling reduces the inci-
dence of teenage marriage by about 10 percentage points. Lastly, the increase
in female schooling has no significant impact on the total number of births,
suggesting that the reduction in teenage births is almost fully compensated by
more births in later years.
Chapter 2 explores the effect of female education on marital outcomes
by exploiting the exogenous variation in educational attainments induced by
the change of compulsory schooling law in the UK in 1972. Using the UK
General Household Survey 1982–2001, we find that schooling does not have
any significant effect either on the probability of marriage or the age at first
marriage. However, education has a significant effect on the age difference
between spouses. One additional year of schooling reduces the age gap between
husband and wife by about 1.4 years. We do not find any evidence that
education reduces marital instability. Our findings suggest that while women’s
schooling does not affect either the probability or the timing of marriage, it
does affect the quality of marriage.
Chapter 3 examines the effect of education on trust. A higher degree of
trust between people is generally associated with greater cooperation. Al-
though it is well documented that better educated people are more likely to
ix
trust others and government, whether this relationship represents causal ef-
fect is not clear. This paper estimates the causal effect of education on trust
by utilizing the exogenous variation in educational attainment induced by the
change of compulsory schooling law in the UK in 1972. Using data from the
British Social Attitudes Survey, we find that education has no significant ef-
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Teenage childbearing negatively affects young mothers’ educational attain-
ment, employment, and socioeconomic status (e.g Angrist and Evans, 1996;
Chevalier and Viitanen, 2003; Geronimus and Korenman, 1992). It also ad-
versely affects the development of their children, from health (e.g Angrist and
Lavy, 1996; Royer, 2004) to school performance (Angrist and Lavy, 1996). Be-
cause those teenage mothers have a longer reproductive period resulting from
their earlier first birth, they may have more children in their lifetimes as well.
An extensive body of literature, including Kravdal and Rindfuss (2008),
Bongaarts (2003), Mart´ın (1995), and Tanfer (1984), has documented that
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female education is negatively associated with total fertility. However, since
poorly educated women often come from large and disadvantaged families, this
widely documented association does not necessarily reflect a causal relation-
ship. Hence, whether more education reduces teenage births and total births
remains an open question.
A growing number of studies have tried to identify the potential causal
relationship between female education and fertility. Most of them utilize the
exogenous variation in educational attainment induced by changes in compul-
sory schooling law (e.g Fort, 2007; Monstad et al., 2008; Black et al., 2008;
DeCicca and Krashinsky, 2015). Exploiting changes in the Italian compulsory
schooling law in the 1960s, Fort (2007) finds that while female education re-
duces teenage births, the negative impact of education on fertility becomes
negligible after age 26. Utilizing the variation in compulsory schooling laws in
both the US and Norway, Black et al. (2008) find that raising women’s educa-
tional attainments indeed reduces teenage births in both countries. Also using
the changes in the compulsory schooling law in Norway as an instrument, Mon-
stad et al. (2008) find that while female educational attainment has a negative
impact on teenage births, it has no significant effect on total fertility, which
is consistent with the findings of Fort (2007). Osili and Long (2008) find that
an increase in women’s schooling, caused by the introduction of the Universal
2
Primary Education (UPE) program in Nigeria in 1976, reduces the number of
children born before the woman reaches age 25. By exploring the variation in
educational attainments induced by the joint impact of school entry policies
and compulsory schooling law, McCrary and Royer (2011) find that education
has no significant impact on the mother’s age at first birth. Recently, Stephens
and Yang (2014) point out that when researchers use changes in state com-
pulsory schooling laws as instrumental variables, the implicit assumption that
there are common trends across US states in the factors affecting different birth
cohorts might not be valid.1 To address the critique by Stephens and Yang
(2014), DeCicca and Krashinsky (2015) include several provincial-level char-
acteristics into their models and find that the effects of education on teenage
births are still significant in Canada.
This chapter estimates the effect of female education on the probability
of teenage childbearing as well as the total number of births in the UK by
exploiting the change in compulsory schooling law in 1972, which raised the
school leaving age from 15 to 16. One advantage of using the UK data is
that the large proportion of compliers makes it possible for us to estimate
the average treatment effect for about a third of the population. Usually, as
1When allowing year of birth effects to vary across regions, Stephens and Yang (2014)
find that previous statistically significant effects of education on wages, unemployment, and
divorce become insignificant.
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pointed out by Oreopoulos et al. (2006), the fraction of people affected by
compulsory schooling law is small. The other advantage is that the data set
contains information on month of birth, so we can identify the affected cohort
more precisely. This policy change has been used by researchers as an IV to
identify the effects of education on a wide range of outcomes. For example,
Clark and Royer (2013) find that education has negligible effect on health and
mortality; Grenet (2013) finds that one additional year of schooling increases
hourly wage rate by 6–7%; and Milligan et al. (2004) find that schooling has
little effect on voting participation.
According to the 1972 compulsory schooling law, individuals born after
September 1957 had to stay in school until age 16; while those born before
September 1957 were not affected by the law as some of them had already
left school when the new law was implemented. As a result, this law change
induced exogenous variation in educational attainment across birth cohorts. It
provides a good opportunity to apply the Regression Discontinuity (RD) design
to address the endogenity in schooling. Using data from General Household
Survey 1982–2001, we find that the new compulsory schooling law forced about
29% of females to stay in school for one more year. On average, it increased
female schooling by about 0.34 years, which is comparable to what has been
documented by Clark and Royer (2013). We also find that one additional year
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of schooling reduces the teenage birth incidence by about seven percentage
points. However, we do not find any significant effect on the total number
of births, which implies that women who reduced births in their teens “catch
up” later in their lives. This is consistent with the findings of Fort (2007) and
Monstad et al. (2008).
Following Black et al. (2008), we examine whether the reduction in teenage
births is mostly via the reduction in the time available for engaging in risky
activities, the so called “incarceration effect”. Because girls can legally leave
school after age 16, the “incarceration effect” should mostly reduce births by
age 17 (taking into account the gestation period). We find that the effects of
compulsory schooling on births at age 16 or 17 are statistically insignificant,
while the effects on the births at ages 18 to 20 are statistically significant. This
suggests that the “incarceration effect” is unlikely to be the major channel. An
alternative explanation is that the rise in school leaving age increases females’
human capital, which in turn raises the opportunity cost of having children as
a teenager. Additional years of schooling could also improve women’s ability to
optimize fertility choices and use contraceptive methods effectively. Schooling
could also affect teenage births via its impact on the timing of first marriage.
Since many women tend to have children after marriage, a rise in school leaving
age might lower teenage births by reducing teenage marriage rate. We indeed
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find that an additional year of schooling reduces the teenage marriage incidence
by about 10 percentage points.
This chapter progresses as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature and
introduces the UK educational system; Section 1.3 discusses the estimation
strategy; Section 1.4 describes the data; Section 1.5 reports the estimation
results; the last section concludes and discusses some relevant issues.
1.2 Background
In this section, we first discuss the channels through which education could
affect the birth outcomes; then we provide some background information on
education in the UK.
1.2.1 Education and fertility
What are the potential channels through which education can influence fertil-
ity? One important channel is income. It is well documented that education
can improve individual wage and income (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card,
1999, 2001; Oreopoulos, 2006). If children are treated as normal goods (Becker,
1960), the demand for children will increase when family income increases,
which is the income effect. On the other hand, when wage increases, the op-
portunity cost of giving birth to and taking care of children will increase. As
a result, the demand for children will decrease. This is the substitution effect.
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Besides affecting individuals’ fertility decisions via income and the oppor-
tunity cost of having children, education level of parents could also affect
their fertility decision via their understanding of the “true rate” of returns to
human capital. As documented by Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011), returns
to schooling are far beyond wage and income. Educated parents might have
better knowledge on the “true” returns. Hence, they might invest more in
each of their children’s education. If the financial market is not perfect, then
these better educated parents might substitute quantity with quality and thus
have fewer children than less educated parents.2 Additionally, schooling may
increase the bargaining power of women (Chiappori et al, 2002) and their crit-
ical thinking ability and social skills (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). As a
result, women with more schooling can get more involved in household deci-
sion making, including birth decisions. Moreover, specific to teenage births,
additional years of schooling prolong the time spent at school and reduce the
time available for engaging in risky behaviors such as unprotected sex. This
is the “incarceration effect” (Black et al., 2008).
2For the large body of literature on the quality-quantity trade-off, see Becker and Lewis
(1973), Becker and Tomes (1976), Hanushek (1992), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), and Liu
(2014).
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1.2.2 Education in the UK
In England and Wales, the school term starts in September, and children need
to enroll in a primary school when they reach age 5 by August 31. They
must stay in school until a certain age that is regulated by the compulsory
schooling law. Students normally attend primary school between the ages of
5 and 11, secondary school between the ages of 12 and 16, college between the
ages of 17 and 18, and university after the age of 18. The British compulsory
schooling law was changed twice in the last century. The first one took place
in 1947, which increased the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15; the
second one happened in 1972, which raised it from 15 to 16. We focus on the
second change in 1972. This is mostly because our data contains very limited
observations of women whose schooling were not affected by the first reform.
The new law was approved by the House of Parliament on March 22, 1972 and
implemented on September 1, 1972 (Statutory Instruments 1972 No. 444).
The new law compelled students to stay in school until grade ten, sit for “O”
level examinations and obtain the Certificate of Secondary Education.3
Individuals who were born after August 31, 1957 had not yet reached the
previous legal school leaving age of 15 when the new law was implemented,
3Enforcement of school attendance: If students are missing from school at compulsory
schooling age, the parents may be prosecuted and they may face a fine of up to 2,500 pounds,
a community order or a jail sentence up to 3 months.
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and so could only leave school in 1973 or later. However, those who were born
before September 1, 1957 were already 15 years old when the new law was
implemented. Had they wanted to leave school at age 15, they could already
have done so before the new law became effective. If individuals born right
before and after September are similar except for their birth month, then the
adoption of the new law provides us with a natural experiment for analyzing
the impact of schooling on various issues. September 1957 is the natural cutoff
separating affected and unaffected cohorts.
To check whether this new compulsory schooling law was really binding,
i.e., whether the law indeed induced variation in educational attainment across
cohorts, we plot the fraction of people who had already left school at the age
of 15 by birth cohort at year-month level in Figure 1.1. For comparison, we
also plot the fraction of individuals who had left school at the age of 16. If
the law was really binding, then the proportion of individuals who had left
school at the age of 15 would be much smaller among those born in September
compared with those born in August of 1957, as the former were affected by
the new law while the latter were not. Since all individuals could leave school
legally at the age of 16, the proportion of individuals who had left school at the
age of 16 should not be affected. The figure indeed shows that the proportion
of people who left school by the age of 15 is much lower for those born in
9
September 1957 than for those born in August of the same year. It was more
than 30% for the latter and less than 10% for the former. By contrast, little
change is seen in the proportion of individuals leaving school by the age of 16.
These results imply that the new compulsory law did affect individuals’ school
leaving decisions.
To the right of the cutoff, there appears to be a small fraction of non-
compliant cohorts, for whom the proportions of leaving school before or at
15 are as high as 20% or even 30%. In fact, these cohorts were mainly born
in June, July, and August, and students born in these three months were
permitted by law to leave school at the end of the school year, i.e., the end
of May. Thus students born between June and August could have finished
secondary school and left school one to three months before reaching age 16.
This pattern also appears in other studies, such as Clark and Royer (2013).
To deal with any possible seasonality which could potentially influence both
the educational attainment and the fertility outcomes, the “month of birth”




RD design is appealing here because the change of compulsory schooling law
in 1972 generated variation in educational attainment across the birth cohorts,
and there is a clear cutoff—September 1957. The cohorts born after the cutoff
were forced to stay in school for one more year, while those born before the
cutoff were not. Assuming the cohorts right above the cutoff and right below
the cutoff are comparable, we can use the outcome of observations right below
the cutoff as the counterfactual for those right above the cutoff.
For the RD design, there are two estimation methods—parametric and
non-parametric methods (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
Using the parametric method, we need to choose an order for the polynomial
control function in the baseline estimation and change the orders of the poly-
nomial in the robustness check. However, there is still no decisive rule for
choosing the order of the polynomial. Besides, high order polynomial con-
trols may be misleading, as pointed out by Gelman and Imbens (2014). Thus,
non-parametric method is adopted in this chapter.
Local linear regressions provide a non-parametric method capable of esti-
mating the treatment effect consistently in an RD design (Hahn et al., 2001).
So local linear regression is adopted, and we need to run linear regressions
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within the “optimal” bandwidth. When choosing the “optimal” bandwidth,
we need to strike a balance between bias and precision. Specifically, if we
choose a larger bandwidth, we have more observations and we can get more
precise estimates, but our linear specification is less likely to be accurate. Sev-
eral methods have been proposed in the literature for choosing the optimal
bandwidth, such as Ludwig and Miller (2007), Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012), and Calonico et al. (2014) (CCT (2014) for short from here on). In
this paper, all of the optimal bandwidths are chosen according to the methods
proposed by CCT (2014).4
1.3.2 Estimation equations
The relationship between fertility outcome and the female educational attain-
ment can be described by the following function:
Yict = γ0 + γ1 Sict + f(Tic, Zic) + γ2Xict + μict, (1.1)
where Yict denotes the fertility outcome of woman i in cohort c at time t;
Sict represents the years of schooling for woman i in cohort c at time t; γ1 is
the parameter of interest; Zic is the assignment variable (normalized month-
year birth cohort relative to the cutoff); Tic is the “Law change” dummy,
4The three methods generate slightly different optimal bandwidths. But the choice of op-
timal bandwidth is not essential to the estimation, because we will use different bandwidths
in the robustness check.
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indicating whether an individual is subject to the new compulsory schooling
law or not; f(T, Z) is a function of the assignment variable, which allows for
different trends on the two sides of the cutoff; in the local linear regression,
f(T, Z) takes the linear form: f(T, Z) = b1Z +b2T ×Z; Xi denotes observable
characteristics of individual i, such as month of birth, age, ethnicity (“white”
dummy); μ is the error term, which captures all of the unobserved factors
which may affect the fertility outcomes, including personal preference, family
background, etc.
We use the equation below to estimate the impact of the compulsory school-
ing law change on individual educational attainment:
Sict = α0 + α1Tic + g(Tic, Zic) + α2Xict + νict, (1.2)
where Sict represents the years of schooling for individual i in cohort c at time
t; Tic is the law change dummy; similar to f(T, Z), g(T, Z) is a linear function
of the assignment variable, which allows for different trends on the two sides of
the cutoff; Xi denotes other observable characteristics of individual i; ν is the
error term, which captures all unobserved factors which may affect educational
attainment, including personal preference, family background, etc.
If we run a simple OLS regression similar to equation (1.1), the estimated
γ1 may be biased, because the educational attainment Sict and the error term
μ are potentially correlated. To illustrate, a woman growing up in a better
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family may obtain more schooling and give birth to fewer babies as a teenager.
The exogenous policy change can help us to address the endogeneity problem.
Specifically, the policy dummy Tic is a valid IV for educational attainment
Sict, because it is correlated with educational attainment Sict but uncorrelated
with the error term μ.
Combining equations (1.1) and (1.2), γ1 can be estimated by 2SLS within
the optimal bandwidth h∗, where Tic is used as excluded instrument for the
endogenous variable “years of schooling”.5 Here γ1 captures the Local Average
Treatment Effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) on the compliers (people who
would stay in school till age 16 if required by the law and leave school at 15
otherwise).
1.3.3 Identification assumption
The key RD assumption is that the conditional expectations of the potential
outcomes are all continuous at the cutoff point in the absence of the policy
change. Then we can attribute any discontinuities we find to the effect of
the policy change. This assumption means that: (1) all of the predetermined
variables, observable or unobservable, are continuous at the cutoff point; (2)
5The optimal bandwidths of the first stage outcome and second stage outcome are
calculated separately. The optimal bandwidth of the first stage outcome is denoted by
h∗S ; and that of the second stage is denoted by h
∗
Y . For simplicity, we can use the
smaller one of the two as the common optimal bandwidth (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008),




individuals cannot fully manipulate the running variable—month-year birth
cohort.
We take two steps to check the validity of the assumption. First, we check
the continuity of the observable predetermined variables. If the observable
variables are continuous at the cutoff, we tend to believe the unobservable
variables are also continuous at the cutoff. We test the continuity of three
observable variables: “female” dummy, “white” dummy, and age at the time
of survey.6 It is not surprising that we do not find any discontinuity at the
cutoff point for these variables, as shown in Figure 1.2.7
Second, we check whether individuals can fully manipulate the birth date.
The new law was approved in March 1972, and it was implemented in Septem-
ber of the same year instantly. It is very unlikely that the parents could predict
the timing of this law change about 15 years before. Even if there was an ex-
pectation that the compulsory schooling would be increased in some coming
year, people could not predict the exact year of the implementation, let alone
the exact month of the implementation. Besides, the parents did not have
any incentive to manipulate the birth date of their children to avoid the new
compulsory schooling law, since it would not have been beneficial to do so.
6It is good if we can also check the discontinuity of the other predetermined variables
such as parents’ education. Unfortunately, such information is not available in the data sets.
7In our full sample, the proportion of females is about 51%, and that of males is about
49%. However, in Figure 2, the proportion of female is around 59%, which is because there
are more missing values in the “month of birth” variable for males.
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But we still draw a figure to check the density of the running variable. As
suggested by panel 4 of Figure 1.2, we do not see any unusual patterns on the
two sides of the cutoff.
To summarize, the cohorts just below and just above the cutoff are com-
parable, indicating that the identification assumption is valid.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 General Household Survey
General Household Survey (GHS) was a repeated annual national survey of
people living in private households in Great Britain. It was conducted by
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and ran from 1972 to 2011.8 The
main aim of the survey was to collect data on a range of core topics, covering
household, family, and individual information. The households were selected
randomly each year. Due to its good representativeness, the GHS data has
been used in many studies, such as Oreopoulos (2006, 2007) and Clark and
Royer (2013). In this chapter, the month-year birth cohort is adopted. Thus,
only the surveys containing information about month and year of birth are
used, namely the surveys from 1982 to 2001.9
In the survey, individuals were asked about their terminal age of full-time
8The GHS has been carried out continuously every year, except for breaks in 1997–1998
when the survey was reviewed, and 1999–2000 when the survey was redeveloped.
9The latest survey data sets are not available to researchers outside the UK.
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education, and we calculate the completed years of schooling based on this
information. The survey also contains basic demographic information, such as
gender, age, and ethnicity.
Specifically, female adults were asked questions about family information,
including birth history: how many children they have given birth to in total,
how many children they gave birth to before age twenty, and their age at first
birth. Fertility outcomes are constructed based on answers to these questions.
“Teenage birth” is a dummy indicating whether or not a woman gave birth to
the first child by 19. To acquire as many observations as possible, “teenage
birth” is constructed based on two variables: age of first birth and number of
children born before the woman’s 20th birthday.10
1.4.2 Summary statistics
Given the RD setting, we choose the sample according to the year of birth,
rather than the age of the subjects. Firstly, we choose subjects born between
1945 and 1970, because they were born close to the cutoff date—September
1957. In total, there are 159,856 observations. We are interested in the fertility
outcomes, so we keep only the females. The proportion of females in our data is
50.86%, so we have 81,309 female observations. In addition, we exclude 8,264
10For survey year 1988–1996, there are about 10,000 observations whose “age of first
birth” values are missing, while “number of children born before 20” values are not missing.
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observations who were younger than 20 at the time of survey, and we get 73,045
observations. Then, excluding 8,429 observations with missing information on
“age left full-time education” and dropping 1,138 outliers who claimed they
left full-time education before the age of 10 or after the age of 30, we get our
full sample of 63,478 observations.
The upper panel of Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of the full
sample. Their ages range from 20 to 56, with a mean of about 33. The
proportion of white females in the sample is 93.9%, and the proportion of
immigrants is 8.3%. Here, the proportions of white and immigrants are very
close to the 2001 census estimates.11 On average, they left school at age 17
and gave birth to 1.7 children in total, and they married at age 22 and gave
birth to their first baby at age 23. About 16% of them gave birth to at least
one baby by the age of 19.
Individuals born in the UK must start attending school at age five. Hence,
their completed years of schooling equals the age they left school minus five.
However, for the immigrants, the data does not contain information on when
they arrived in the UK. It is possible that they started school at different ages
in their home countries. Consequently, we cannot calculate their completed
11In the 2001 census, the percentage of immigrants is about 8.3 and the percentage of white
is about 92.12. Our sample statistics are reasonable because the surveys were conducted in
the 1980s and 1990s, when the proportion of white was a little bit higher.
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years of schooling. So we exclude the immigrants from the full sample. We
calculate the optimal bandwidths for all of the outcome variables according to
the method proposed by CCT (2014). The optimal bandwidths for the main
outcomes—years of schooling, teenage birth, and the total number of children,
are 47, 43, and 43 months respectively. For the purpose of comparison across
different outcomes, we choose 43 as the common bandwidth for all of the
outcomes. Hence, our “discontinuity sample”, which is used for the baseline
estimation in this paper, consists of subjects who were born between February
1954 and March 1961.
The lower panel of Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for our discon-
tinuity sample. The ages range between 20 and 47, with a mean of about 32.
The proportion of whites is 98%, as the immigrants are excluded. The average
age on leaving full-time education is 17; so, the completed years of schooling
is 12 on average. The subjects in the discontinuity sample are comparable
to those in the full sample, except that they are about one year younger on
average.
1.5 Estimation results
In this section, we report the estimation results. We first show the results for
the first stage, i.e., the effects of the compulsory schooling law change in 1972
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on the individual educational attainments. Then we show the second stage
results, i.e., the effects of education on fertility outcomes.
1.5.1 Impacts of the law
First we estimate the effects of the compulsory schooling law on the probabil-
ities of leaving school by different ages, including the age at which the law is
binding (15) and higher ages at which it is not binding (16–20). The estima-
tion results are shown in Table 1.2. The optimal bandwidth chosen according
to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were born between February 1954 and
March 1961 are included in the regressions. Month of birth dummies, sur-
vey year dummies, month-year birth cohort (Z), and its interaction term with
“Law change” dummy (T × Z) are included in all of the regressions. Column
(1) suggests that the new compulsory schooling law reduced the incidence of
leaving by 15 by about 29%, indicating that about 29% of the females above
the cutoff were compelled by the law to stay in school until 16. Across columns
(2) to (6), the estimated coefficients are all very small, and none of them are
statistically significant at the 10% significance level, which implies that the
compulsory schooling law did not influence individual school leaving decision
remarkably beyond age 16. To summarize, the 1972 compulsory schooling law
forced about 29% of females to stay in school for just one more year.
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1.5.2 First stage
We first draw a figure exploring the relationship between birth cohorts and
years of schooling. In Figure 1.3, each dot represents the mean of years of
schooling for the month-year birth cohort. And linear trends are imposed on
both sides of the cutoff separately to fit the relationship between individual
years of schooling and birth cohorts, with 95% confidence intervals being added
as well. The figure shows that there is a clear jump for the individuals on the
right of the cutoff, and the magnitude of the discontinuity is about 0.34 years.
The regression results of the first stage are shown in Table 1.3. Month of
birth dummies, month-year birth cohort (Z), and its interaction with “Law
change” dummy (T × Z) are included in all of the regressions. The optimal
bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were born
between February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the regression (1). We
check the robustness of the first stage result by varying the bandwidths around
the “optimal” bandwidth of 43 months. From column (2) to column (5), the
bandwidths used are 55, 49, 37, and 31 months respectively. The estimated
coefficients in column (2) to (5) are all significant at the 1% significance level.
The magnitudes range between 0.29 and 0.34 years. As indicated by Table
1.3, the results are not sensitive to the choice of bandwidths. We can conclude
that the law change in 1972 induced an increase in female years of schooling by
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about 0.34 years. Our estimates here are comparable to those of the previous
studies which utilize the same law change in the UK. For instance, Clark and
Royer (2013) find that this law change increased 0.31 years of schooling for
females and 0.36 years for males.
1.5.3 Teenage birth
Now we examine the effect of education on teenage birth. We also test the
channels through which education can influence teenage fertility.
Effects on teenage birth
Teenage birth refers to giving birth to a child before age 20, when the mother
is not mature enough to take good care of the baby. Teenage childbearing
may impose negative influence on the socioeconomic status of young moth-
ers (Angrist and Evans, 1996; Chevalier and Viitanen, 2003; Geronimus and
Korenman, 1992), as well as undesirable effects on the health or school per-
formance of the children (Royer, 2004; Angrist and Lavy, 1996).
In this subsection, we examine whether more schooling can reduce the
incidence of teenage birth. First, we examine the visual evidence shown in
Figure 1.4. The relationship between teenage birth and the birth cohort is
fitted by linear trends separately on the two sides of the cutoff. At the cutoff,
there is a sharp drop in the teenage birth incidence, which suggests that the
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cohorts above the cutoff experienced fewer teenage births.
Now we examine the effects of education on the probability of giving birth
as a teenager. In Table 1.4, the OLS estimation results are displayed in column
(1) and the 2SLS estimation results are reported in column (2) to (6). Month
of birth dummies, month-year birth cohort (Z), and its interaction with “Law
change” dummy (T × Z) are included in all of the regressions. The optimal
bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were born
between February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the regressions in (1)
and (2). In column (1), OLS estimates suggest that one additional year of
schooling is associated with a 2.9 percentage points decrease in teenage birth
incidence. By contrast, the 2SLS estimates in column (2) imply that one
additional year of schooling at the secondary school level reduces the teenage
birth incidence by about seven percentage points. It is not unusual that the
IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates in the return to education
literature, as pointed out by Oreopoulos (2006) and Card (1999). They argue
that marginal rates of return to schooling may be negatively correlated with
the level of schooling across the population, and the rates of return may be
higher around the secondary school level. Relative to the dependent variable
mean, our estimates imply that one additional year of schooling reduces the
teenage birth rate by about 42%. The effect is quite large, because the effect
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on the compliers may be large. Our estimates are comparable to those of
the other studies. For instance, DeCicca and Krashinsky (2015) find that in
Canada, an additional year of schooling reduces the birth incidence at ages
17 and 18 by roughly two and three percentage points respectively, which
translate to one-third and one-half relative to the dependent variable mean.
Furthermore, we check the robustness of the effects on teenage birth by
varying the bandwidths in the 2SLS estimations. From column (3) to column
(6), the bandwidths used are 55, 49, 37, and 31 months respectively. When we
change the bandwidths, the magnitudes of the coefficients range between -0.08
and -0.07, and the coefficients are significant in all of the regressions. Thus,
the results are not sensitive to the selection of bandwidths. Our findings
suggest that compulsory schooling at the secondary school level can reduce
the incidence of teenage births, which are in line with many previous studies
(DeCicca and Krashinsky, 2015; Kirdar et al., 2009; Black et al., 2008; Monstad
et al., 2008; Fort, 2007).
Distinguish the channels
Now we have found that more schooling can reduce the incidence of teenage
fertility. There are two possible models which can explain the fact: the “in-
carceration” effect and the human capital effect (Black et al., 2008). The
incarceration effect means that when students are forced to stay in school,
24
they have less time to be involved in risky behavior, such as careless sex. By
contrast, the human capital effect means that when women have more school-
ing, they would have more and better work opportunities, so they may delay
their childbearing.
By definition, the incarceration effect only influences female fertility be-
havior at the ages where the compulsory schooling law is binding, while the
human capital effect affects the fertility beyond the ages where the law is bind-
ing. The 1972 compulsory schooling law forces students to stay in school till
16. And in the previous section, we have shown that this law did not affect
individual school leaving decision beyond age 16. If only the incarceration
effect is present, we should observe that compulsory schooling only influences
fertility at age 16 or 17 (if we consider the 9 months of gestation period).
Contrarily, if we observe that compulsory schooling affects fertility beyond 17
significantly, we tend to accept that the human capital effect is present as well.
Although Black et al. (2008) find significant human capital effect besides
the weak incarceration effect, DeCicca and Krashinsky (2015) only find signif-
icant incarceration effect in the Canadian context. We try to identify whether
there is a human capital effect by checking the effect of education on births
by different ages, the results of which are shown in Table 1.5. Again, subjects
who were born between February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the
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regressions.12 The effects on births by 16 and 17 are both small and statis-
tically insignificant, but the effects on births by 18, 19, or 20 are all large
and statistically significant. The results here cannot exclude the incarceration
effect, but they indeed imply that the human capital effect may affect teenage
childbearing. Our findings here are consistent with those of Black et al. (2008)
but in contrast to those of DeCicca and Krashinsky (2015).
Additional channel—teenage marriage
It is well documented in the literature that female education and their marriage
outcomes are correlated (Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006; Bruze, 2015; Anderberg
and Zhu, 2014). Specifically, a change in the timing of marriage could be
translated into a change in the timing of childbearing, as argued by Kirdar
et al. (2009). Thus, teenage marriage could be a potential channel through
which education affects teenage births.
In the full sample, there are 12,203 women who gave birth to at least one
baby by age 20, and about 46% of them got married at least one year earlier
than they gave birth to a baby.13 And another 24% got married and gave birth
at the same age, so we cannot tell whether they got married before giving birth.
The remaining 30% got married after giving birth, or remained unmarried at
12The dependent variable here is constructed from the survey variable “age of first birth”,
so it has 1,767 fewer observations than the variable “teenage birth”.
13In UK, people can legally get married at age 16 or over, but they need permissions from
parents if they are under 18.
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the time of survey. We can see that a large proportion of women got married
at least one year earlier than they gave birth. This indicates that if the timing
of marriage is postponed, then the timing of childbearing may be postponed
consequently. So it is valuable to check whether more schooling reduces the
probability of getting married as a teenager.
Table 1.6 reports the estimation results from regressing the probability of
marriage by a given age on female years of schooling and a full set of control
variables. Subjects who were born between February 1954 and March 1961 are
included in all of the regressions. Except those in column (1) and column (6),
the estimated coefficients are all statistically significant. The results indicate
that more schooling reduces the incidence of teenage marriage. Specifically, the
estimate in column (4) suggests that one additional year of schooling reduces
the probability of getting married as a teenager by about ten percentage points.
Here we do find more schooling reduces the incidence of teenage marriage,
which is in line with the findings of Kirdar et al. (2009). The findings here
are not sufficient to prove the conjecture that more schooling postpones the
timing of marriage and that delayed marriage results in the postponement of
early births. Nevertheless, they are at least consistent with this conjecture.
So teenage marriage could be a potential channel through which education
affects the teenage birth. Of course, this channel only applies to the subgroup
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of women in the sample who got married at least one year earlier than they
gave birth.
1.5.4 Total number of children
Now we have found that compulsory schooling reduces teenage births. Is
this effect long-lasting? Specifically, if some women have reduced births as
teenagers due to additional schooling, do they also have fewer total births
during their lifetime? To answer this question, we explore the effects of educa-
tion on the total number of children. Ideally, we should choose a sub-sample
of women who have already completed their lifetime childbearing, i.e., women
who are above age 45 or 50. Unfortunately, the first cohort affected by the 1972
compulsory schooling law are only 44 years old in the latest 2001 survey, so
we cannot get a sub-sample of women who are above 50.14 Compromisingly,
we choose a sub-sample of women who are above 30. First, we investigate
whether there is a discontinuity in the total number of children at the cutoff
in Figure 1.5. Again, the dots represent the cohort means, and linear trends
as well as 95% confidence intervals are fitted separately on the two sides of the
cutoff. It is obvious that the 95% confidence intervals overlap at the cutoff,
and there is no remarkable discontinuity.
14The survey data sets after 2001 which contain “month of birth” information are only
available to researchers staying in the UK.
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We estimate the effect of female education on the total number of children
by running OLS and 2SLS regressions. In Table 1.7, the OLS estimation results
are displayed in column (1) and the 2SLS estimation results are reported in
columns (2) to (6). Month of birth dummies, month-year birth cohort (Z),
and its interaction with “Law change” dummy (T × Z) are included in all
of the regressions. The optimal bandwidth is 43, so subjects who were born
between February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the regressions (1)
and (2). The OLS estimate in column (1) is significant at the 1% significance
level, which suggests women with one more year of schooling have 0.08 fewer
children. By contrast, the 2SLS estimate in column (2) is insignificant at the
10% significance level, although the magnitude is large.
We also check the robustness of the effects on total births by changing the
bandwidths. From column (3) to column (6), the bandwidths used are 55,
49, 37, and 31 months respectively. None of the estimates are statistically
significant at the 10% significance level, and the estimated coefficient even
becomes positive in column (6). The difference between OLS estimates and
the 2SLS estimates implies the importance of applying some IV method when
we try to estimate the effect of female education on fertility. To conclude, the
2SLS estimation results suggest that the effects of educational attainment on
the total number of children are negligible. Our findings are consistent with
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Monstad et al. (2008) and Fort (2007) but in contrast to Leon (2004) and Osili
and Long (2008).
1.6 Conclusion and discussion
Taking advantage of the 1972 compulsory schooling law change in the UK, we
examine the effects of female education on their fertility behaviors with RD
design. First, we find that the 1972 compulsory schooling law forced about
29% of the affected females to stay in school for one more year. Consequently,
their schooling increased by about 0.35 years. The 2SLS estimation results
suggest that one additional year of schooling reduces teenage birth incidence
by about seven percentage points, while the effects on the total number of
births are negligible. These two estimates indicate that women who reduced
the number of births as teenagers “caught up” later in their lives. In other
words, schooling might only postpone the timing of having children. This is
consistent with the findings from several recent studies, such as Black et al.
(2008), Monstad et al. (2008), and Fort (2007). Because schooling raises both
income, which increases the demand for children, and the opportunity cost
of having children, which reduces the demand, the lack of causal relationship
suggests that the income effect and substitution effect may cancel each other
out.
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Our finding on the causal relationship between schooling and teenage child-
bearing, which imposes undesirable effects on both the young mothers and
their children, suggests that the benefits of implementing a more stringent
compulsory schooling law are beyond the labor market. Our results resonate
with Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011) who find that there are a wide range of
non-pecuniary returns to education.
Looking into the channel through which education affects teenage birth, we
fail to find any statistically significant “incarceration effect”. Our findings are
in line with those of Black et al. (2008) and Kirdar et al. (2009) but in contrast
to those of DeCicca and Krashinsky (2015). An alternative channel is that
schooling raises women’s human capital, which increases their opportunity
cost of having babies as teenagers. Indeed, Grenet (2013), who utilizes the
same compulsory schooling law, finds that a one additional year of schooling
increases hourly wage rate by 6–7% in the UK. Besides increasing human
capital, schooling may delay marriage as well, as suggested by Kirdar et al.
(2009), which in turn reduces teenage births. We do find that a one year
increase in schooling reduces teenage marriage incidence by 10 percentage
points.
A caveat to the lack of causal relationship between education and total
number of births is that females in our sample were still in their fertile age at
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the end of the survey period. The first cohort affected by the 1972 compulsory
schooling law were only 44 years old in the latest 2001 survey. Nevertheless,
the total fertility rate of our sample, 1.78, is comparable to the total fertility
rate in the UK.15 This similarity suggests that our results are unlikely to be
sensitive to adding more women in their later stage of reproductive cycle into
our analysis. Moreover, since women whose schooling was affected by the new
law were younger than those not affected, adding more mature women to our
analysis should strengthen the claim that education has no strong negative
effect on total number of children.
15According to United-Nations (2013), the total fertility rate in the UK is 1.74 in 1995–
2000, 1.66 in 2000–2005, and 1.88 in 2005–2010.
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Figure 1.1: Age of leaving full time education by month-year birth cohort
Notes: All of the individuals born between 1945 and 1970 are included. The hor-
izontal axis represents the month-year birth cohort. The upper line represents the
proportion of leaving school by age 16, while the lower line represents the proportion
of leaving school by age 15. Each dot represents the month-year birth cohort mean.
The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 1.2: Balancing check
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths in the first three panels, where
each dot represents the month-year birth cohort mean. The last panel shows the
density of observations within the optimal bandwidths. The vertical line denotes the
cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 1.3: Impact of law change on educational attainment
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-
year birth cohort mean. The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 1.4: Effects of education on teenage birth
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-
year birth cohort mean. The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 1.5: Effects of education on total number of children
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-
year birth cohort mean. The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Full sample
Age 63,478 33.17 7.763 20 56
White 63,478 0.939 0.240 0 1
Age left school 63,478 17.18 2.728 10 30
Teenage birth 52,566 0.161 0.368 0 1
Total number of children 54,082 1.710 1.235 0 10
Age of first marriage 47,948 21.63 3.617 15 49
Age of first birth 43,156 23.48 4.345 15 47
Year of birth 63,478 1,956 7.039 1945 1970
Month of birth 63,050 6.370 3.412 1 12
Survey year 63,478 1,990 5.009 1982 2001
immigrant 63,478 0.0833 0.276 0 1
Discontinuity sample
Age 17,380 31.77 5.402 20 47
White 17,380 0.984 0.127 0 1
Age left school 17,380 17.23 2.652 11 30
Years of schooling 17,380 12.23 2.652 6 25
Teenage birth 13,875 0.168 0.374 0 1
Total number of children 14,195 1.781 1.140 0 10
Age of first marriage 14,012 21.49 3.591 15 45
Age of first birth 12,108 23.60 4.338 15 42
Year of birth 17,380 1,957 2.092 1954 1961
Month of birth 17,380 6.271 3.425 1 12
Survey year 17,380 1,990 5.060 1982 2001
Notes: The upper panel shows the summary statistics for the full sample, i.e., all of the
females who were born between 1945 and 1970. The lower panel shows the summary
statistics for the discontinuity sample, i.e., the subjects who were born around the
cutoff—September 1957. The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is
43 months, so subjects who were born between February 1954 and March 1961 are
included in the discontinuity sample. Immigrants are excluded because we cannot
calculate their completed years of schooling.
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Table 1.2: Impacts of the compulsory schooling law on school leaving age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES by 15 by 16 by 17 by 18 by 19 by 20
Law change -0.2853*** -0.0110 -0.0189 -0.0081 -0.0064 -0.0072
(0.0130) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.0105)
White 0.0309 0.1181*** 0.0798*** 0.0473* 0.0206 0.0226
(0.0198) (0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0247) (0.0256) (0.0253)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,380 17,380 17,380 17,380 17,380 17,380
Dep. var. mean 0.21 0.60 0.71 0.80 0.83 0.85
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were
born between February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the regressions. “Law change”
is a dummy, which equals 1 if the individual is subject to the new compulsory schooling law.
Cohort trend includes the assignment variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction
with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year birth cohort
level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 1.3: Effects of compulsory schooling law on educational attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bandwidths (months) 43 55 49 37 31
VARIABLES Years of schooling
Law change 0.3352*** 0.3405*** 0.3429*** 0.3077*** 0.2862***
(0.0772) (0.0712) (0.0750) (0.0803) (0.0926)
White -0.2904* -0.4122*** -0.3147** -0.1996 -0.2322
(0.1551) (0.1507) (0.1414) (0.1662) (0.1945)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,380 22,227 19,748 14,830 12,340
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were
born between February 1954 and March 1961 are included in regression (1). The bandwidths
used in regressions (2) to (5) are 55, 49, 37, and 31 months respectively. “Law change” is
a dummy, which equals 1 if the individual is subject to the new compulsory schooling law.
Cohort trend includes the assignment variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction
with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year birth
cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 1.4: Effects of education on teenage birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS
Bandwidths (months) 43 55 49 37 31
Years of schooling -0.0286*** -0.0658** -0.0782*** -0.0815*** -0.0849** -0.0742*
(0.0011) (0.0267) (0.0278) (0.0275) (0.0343) (0.0415)
White -0.0876*** -0.0917*** -0.1074*** -0.0933*** -0.0887*** -0.0792***
(0.0202) (0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0220) (0.0235) (0.0251)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,875 13,875 17,733 15,745 11,831 9,864
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were born between
February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the baseline regressions (1) and (2). The bandwidths used
in regressions (3) to (6) are 55, 49, 37, and 31 months respectively. Cohort trend includes the assignment
variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors
are clustered at the month-year birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 1.5: Effects of education on giving birth by a given age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES by 16 by 17 by 18 by 19 by 20 by 21
Years of schooling -0.0184 -0.0085 -0.0473* -0.0716** -0.0844** -0.0597
(0.0156) (0.0232) (0.0286) (0.0351) (0.0355) (0.0379)
White -0.0147 -0.0439** -0.0682*** -0.1057*** -0.0883*** -0.1001***
(0.0122) (0.0210) (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0295) (0.0332)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,108 12,108 12,108 12,108 12,108 12,108
Dep.var. mean 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.27 0.35
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were born
between February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the regressions. Cohort trend includes the
assignment variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy
T. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***,
p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 1.6: Effects of education on marriage by a given age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES by 16 by 17 by 18 by 19 by 20 by 21
Years of schooling -0.0290 -0.0779** -0.1205*** -0.0973** -0.0753* -0.0148
(0.0189) (0.0382) (0.0467) (0.0452) (0.0423) (0.0478)
White 0.0049 -0.0180 -0.0264 0.0178 0.0672* 0.0824**
(0.0107) (0.0226) (0.0320) (0.0317) (0.0362) (0.0343)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,012 14,012 14,012 14,012 14,012 14,012
Dep. var. mean 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.32 0.46 0.59
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were born
between February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the regressions. Cohort trend includes
the assignment variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change”
dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year birth cohort level. Significance levels
are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 1.7: Effects of education on total number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS
Bandwidths (months) 43 55 49 37 31
VARIABLES Total number of children
Years of schooling -0.0768*** -0.1660 -0.0811 -0.1440 -0.1155 0.0821
(0.0039) (0.1585) (0.1264) (0.1355) (0.2086) (0.3235)
Age 0.0146*** 0.0162*** 0.0118*** 0.0145*** 0.0161*** 0.0181***
(0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0066)
White 0.0800 0.0694 0.0345 0.0717 0.0668 0.0216
(0.0879) (0.0951) (0.0854) (0.0843) (0.1030) (0.1011)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,351 10,351 13,187 11,732 8,812 7,355
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 43, so subjects who were born between
February 1954 and March 1961 are included in the baseline regressions (1) and (2). The bandwidths used
in regressions (3) to (6) are 55, 49, 37, and 31 months respectively. Cohort trend includes the assignment
variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors




Female Education and Marriage
Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
As pointed out by Becker and Lewis (1973), marital patterns can have im-
portant implications on fertility, women’s labor force participation, inequality,
and intergenerational mobility. One of the most commonly observed patterns
is that better educated women tend to marry better educated men, which sug-
gests that education could play an important role in determining who marries
whom. Goldin (1992) documents that having a higher chance of marrying
a college graduate was an important reason for women to attend college in
the 1960s and 1970s. This paper aims to examine whether there is a causal
relationship between female education and their marriage outcomes.
Better educated women have some advantages over less educated ones in
the matching stage. First, schooling is the signal for “ability” (quality). Be-
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sides, women with more schooling are appealing either because they are more
efficient in household production or because they have better career prospects. 1
In addition, education might be able to extend an individual’s social network.
So better educated women can access a wider and higher quality pool of poten-
tial spouses than less educated women. Indeed, women with more schooling
are more likely to marry highly educated men (Mare, 1991; Pencavel, 1998).2
Education may also improve the quality of the match. First, schooling may
facilitate the socialization between couples via improving their social skills
(Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). Besides, learning from the spouse may be a
unique channel for human capital accumulation, because the couples can share
ideas within the family (Huang et al., 2009). Indeed, researchers have found
that spousal education matters for earnings, namely the “cross-productivity
effect” (Huang et al., 2009; Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006).3 Thus, women’s
education may play an important role not only in the matching stage but also
1For example, education might improve women’s ability to process health information
or knowledge of healthy behavior during pregnancy, which improves infant health (Currie
and Moretti, 2003; Breierova and Duflo, 2004; McCrary and Royer, 2011). And Juhn and
Murphy (1997) finds that women who have better career prospects are appealing to high
earning males.
2There are also other forms of assortative mating based on different characteristics, such
as occupation (Hout, 1982), ethnicity (Pagnini and Morgan, 1990), and physical character-
istics (Epstein and Guttman, 1984).
3Using Chinese twins data, Huang et al. (2009) find that both cross-productivity and
mating are important in explaining the current earnings, but the cross-productivity effect
mainly runs from husbands to wives. Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) find that women’ edu-
cation may have a positive effect on husband’s earnings, but they cannot disentangle the
mating effect and cross-productivity effect.
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in the adaptive socialization stage.
Consistent with the above arguments, researchers do find that female edu-
cation could improve their marital outcomes. For example, Lefgren and McIn-
tyre (2006) find that additional schooling does not influence the probability
of marriage, but it does increase the earnings of the husbands. Anderberg
and Zhu (2014) find that although obtaining some academic qualification has
little effect on the probability of being married, it does increase the probability
of the husband holding some academic qualification and being economically
active. The previous studies focus on the socioeconomic characteristics of the
husband. One marital outcome which has rarely been explored in the litera-
ture is the age gap of the couples. So, in this paper we would like to investigate
how female education affects the age gap between couples.
Aside from the age gap of the couples, we also explore the effect of edu-
cation on marital stability. If education improves interpersonal skills, more
schooling helps women enjoy a more stable marriage. Some studies show
that schooling is correlated with marriage stability, for example, Lefgren and
McIntyre (2006) documents that the marriage turnover rate is lower among
well-educated women. Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011) find that more school-
ing is associated with a smaller probability of ever getting divorced. But these
estimates may suffer from omitted variable bias since they use OLS estima-
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tion and there are omitted variables that may influence both the educational
attainment and the marriage stability, such as individual intelligence, family
background, etc. For example, women with higher intelligence may obtain
more schooling, and they may also be good at dealing with conflicts within
the marriage and maintaining the marital relationship. In addition, there is
one possible situation which has scarcely been noticed by the previous studies.
That is, when education level increases, women become more economically
independent, so they may be more likely to terminate the current marriage
if it is not a good match. Hence, the overall effect of education on marital
stability may be ambiguous.
This chapter examines the effect of education on marital outcomes for
women in the UK. Utilizing the exogenous variation in education attainment
induced by the change of compulsory schooling law in 1972 and Regression
Discontinuity (RD) design, we find that female schooling has significant ef-
fects neither on the probability of marriage nor on the age at first marriage.
However, education does have a significant effect on the age differences be-
tween spouses. One additional year of schooling reduces the age gap between
husband and wife by about 1.4 years. The findings imply that education may
contribute to the positive assortative mating in terms of age. We do not find
evidence that education reduces the probability of being divorced or separated.
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This chapter contributes to the literature as follows. First, this chapter
explores the effect of education on the age difference between couples, which
is rarely studied in the literature. Second, this chapter adds new evidence
to the literature of non-monetary return to education, which explores the
effects of education outside the labor market (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011;
Grossman, 2006). The research on return to female education is also helpful for
understanding the worldwide boom of female education (Becker et al., 2010).
For example, Chiappori et al. (2009) suggest that the rise in female schooling
in the US may be caused by the increase in the female marriage market returns
to schooling.
This chapter progresses as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the related litera-
ture and provides background information about education in the UK; Section
2.3 discusses the estimation strategy; Section 2.4 describes the data; Section
2.5 reports the estimation results; the last section concludes the paper and
discusses some relevant issues.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Related literature
Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker (1974, 1991) provide basic models for
the economic analysis of marriage and family. Becker’s theory is based on the
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“production complementarities”, in which husband and wife specialize in the
market and household production respectively. However, the development of
labor-saving technology and the service industries free women from the house-
hold production substantially. Besides, the declining fertility rate relieves the
duty of taking care of the baby in the family. Thus, nowadays the labor market
participation rate of women is increasing steadily. Theses changes imply that
the importance of production complementarities in the marriage matching is
declining, while the importance of leisure and consumption complementarities
is increasing (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). Due to this change, women with
more education and better career prospects may be more appealing to the high
earning males.
Indeed, for the females, more schooling increases the probability of mar-
rying high earning men. For instance, Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) uses the
US 2000 Census data to explore the effect of education on marital outcomes
for white women between 30 and 45. Utilizing birth quarter as the instrument
for educational attainment, they find that although the level of education has
little effect on the probability of marriage, the effect on the husband’s earnings
is positive and significant.
More education may also help women to marry men with some academic
qualifications. For example, Anderberg and Zhu (2014) utilize a historical
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school leaving policy in the UK to examine the effect of female education
on marital outcomes.4 They find that for women aged 25 or above, holding
some academic qualification does not affect the probability of being currently
married, but it does increase the probability of the husband holding some
qualification and being economically active.
The effect of education on the probability of marriage is not clear. On
the one hand, more schooling may make women more attractive, thus they
may have a better position in the marriage market. On the other hand, more
schooling makes women earn higher income, which means women with more
schooling are more economically independent (of men), so they may delay the
timing of marriage or even stay out of marriage. Theoretically, it is ambiguous
whether more schooling affects the probability of marriage.
Although women with more schooling may be appealing in the marriage
market, they may not necessarily get married earlier because there are other
factors which may delay the timing of marriage. First, as pointed out by
Oppenheimer (1988), the timing of transition to the adult economic role is
an important determinant of the timing of marriage, because people usually
need economic independence to proceed to marriage. For women with more
schooling, the transition to work status comes later, so they may marry later
4Since 1962 and up to 1997, students in Britain born between September 1 and January
31 (of the following year) could leave compulsory schooling one term earlier than the others.
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accordingly. Second, women with more schooling may have better marriage
prospects, thus they may set higher minimally acceptable quality standards
for a husband. The higher expected return from searching and the higher
minimally acceptable match may imply a longer time spent on searching.5
However, if the highly educated and low educated women search in different
pools of men, the highly educated women may not necessarily spend more
time searching for a husband.
Female education may affect the age gap between couples as well. Although
economic models (Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993; Siow, 1998) and common
sense predict that marriage between an older and a younger spouse requires
financial success of the older partner, Mansour and McKinnish (2014) find
that in the US, men and women who are married to differently-aged spouses
have lower cognitive skills, lower educational attainment, and lower annual
earnings. That is to say, women with more schooling are more likely to marry
men with similar ages. If women stay in school for more years, the probability
of marrying their classmates may increase. Also, women with more schooling
may have fewer age-diverse social networks. As a result, more schooling might
reduce the age gap of the couple.
The effect of education on marital stability is inconclusive.6 On the one
5See Rogerson et al. (2005) for a survey of the basic search models; see Weiss (1997) and
Oppenheimer (1988) for a review of applying search models to marriage markets.
6Becker et al. (1977) provide a theoretic framework for the analysis of marital instability.
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hand, education may improve communication skills which play an important
role in the marriage relationship, suggesting that more schooling can reduce
marital instability. On the other hand, education can increase the wage rate
and earnings of females, which makes women more economically independent
(of men). If their current marriage turns out to be unsuccessful, women with
more schooling may terminate the current marriage immediately, and they are
not in a hurry to start a new marriage, because they are better equipped to
cope outside of marriage.
2.2.2 Education in the UK
In England and Wales, the school term starts in September, and children need
to enroll in a primary school when they reach age 5 by August 31. They
must stay in school until a certain age that is regulated by the compulsory
schooling law. The British compulsory schooling law was changed twice in the
last century. The first one took place in 1947, which increased the minimum
school leaving age from 14 to 15; and the second one happened in 1972, which
raised it from 15 to 16. We focus on the second change in 1972. This is
mostly because our data contains very limited observations of women whose
schooling were not affected by the first reform. The new law was approved by
They also argue that an increase in education has an ambiguous effect on the probability of
dissolution or remarriage.
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the House of Parliament on March 22, 1972 and implemented on September 1,
1972 (Statutory Instruments 1972 No. 444). The new law compelled students
to stay in school until grade ten, sit for “O” level examinations and obtain the
Certificate of Secondary Education.7
Individuals who were born after August 31, 1957 had not yet reached the
previous legal school leaving age of 15 when the new law was implemented,
and so could only leave in 1973 or later. However, those who were born
before September 1, 1957 were already 15 years old when the new law was
implemented. Had they wanted to leave school at age 15, they could already
have done so before the new law became effective. If individuals born right
before and after September are similar except for their birth month, then the
adoption of the new law provides us with a natural experiment for analyzing
the impact of schooling on various issues. September 1957 is the natural cutoff
separating affected and unaffected cohorts.
To check whether this new compulsory schooling law was really binding,
i.e., whether the law indeed induced variation in educational attainment across
cohorts, we plot the fraction of people who had already left school at age 15
by birth cohorts at year-month level in Figure 2.1. For comparison, we also
7Enforcement of school attendance: If students are missing from school at compulsory
schooling age, the parents may be prosecuted and they may face a fine of up to 2,500 pounds,
a community order or a jail sentence up to 3 months.
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plot the fraction of individuals who had already left school at age 16. If the
law was really binding, then the proportion of individuals who had left school
at age 15 would be much smaller among those born in September compared
with those born in August of 1957, as the former were affected by the new
law while the latter were not. Since all individuals could leave school legally
at age 16, the proportion of individuals who had already left school at age 16
should not be affected. The figure indeed shows that the proportion of people
who left school by age 15 was much lower for those born in September 1957
than for those born in August of the same year. It was more than 30% for the
latter and less than 10% for the former. By contrast, little change is seen in
the proportion of individuals leaving school by age 16 . These results imply
that the new compulsory law did affect individuals’ school leaving decisions.
To the right of the cutoff, there seems to be a small fraction of non-
compliant cohorts, for whom the proportions of leaving school before or at
15 are as high as 20% or even 30%. In fact, these cohorts were mainly born in
June, July, and August, and students born in these three months were permit-
ted by the law to leave school at the end of the school year, i.e., the end of May.
Thus students who were born between June and August could have finished
secondary school and left school one to three months before reaching age 16.
This pattern also appears in other studies, such as Clark and Royer (2013).
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To deal with any possible seasonality which could potentially influence both
the educational attainment and the fertility outcomes, the “month of birth”
dummies are controlled in all of the estimations.
2.3 Strategy
2.3.1 RD design
RD design is appealing here since the change of compulsory schooling law in
1972 generated variation in education attainment across the birth cohorts, and
there is a clear cutoff—September 1957. The cohorts born after the cutoff were
forced to stay in school for one more year, while those born before the cutoff
were not. Assuming the cohorts right above the cutoff and right below the
cutoff are comparable, we can use the outcome of observations right below the
cutoff as the counterfactual for those right above the cutoff.
Local linear regressions provide a nonparametric method which can esti-
mate the treatment effect consistently in an RD design (Hahn et al., 2001). So
local linear regression is adopted, and we need to run linear regressions within
the “optimal” bandwidth. Several methods have been proposed in the litera-
ture for choosing the optimal bandwidth, such as Ludwig and Miller (2007),
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), and Calonico et al. (2014) (CCT (2014) for
short from here on). In this chapter, all of the optimal bandwidths are chosen
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by the method proposed by CCT (2014).8 In this chapter, the month-year
birth cohort is adopted.
2.3.2 Estimation equation
We use the following equation to describe the relationship between marital
outcome and the educational attainment:
Yict = γ0 + γ1 Eict + g(Zic, Tic) + γ2Xict + μict, (2.1)
where Yict denotes the marital outcomes of individual i in cohort c at time
t; Eict represents the years of schooling for individual i in cohort c at time
t; γ1 is the parameter of interest; Zic is the assignment variable (normalized
month-year birth cohort relative to cutoff); Tic is the policy dummy, indicating
whether the woman is subject to the new compulsory schooling law or not;
g(Z, T ) = a1Z + a2T × Z, which allows for different trends on the two sides
of the cutoff; Xi denotes the other observable characteristics of individual i,
such as month of birth, age, age squared, and ethnicity (white or not); μ is the
error term, which captures all the other unobservable factors which may affect
the marital outcomes, including personal intelligence, family background, etc.
We use the equation below to estimate the impact of the change of com-
8The three methods generate slightly different optimal bandwidths. But the choice of op-
timal bandwidth is not essential to the estimation, because we will use different bandwidths
in the robustness check.
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pulsory schooling law on the individual educational attainment:
Eict = α0 + α1Tic + s(Zic, Tic) + α2Xict + νict, (2.2)
where Eict is the years of schooling for individual i in cohort c at time t; s(Z, T )
is a function similar to g(Z, T ), allowing for different trends on the two sides of
the cutoff; Xi denotes observable characteristics of individual i; ν is the error
term, which captures all the other unobserved factors which may affect the
educational attainment, including personal intelligence, family background,
etc.
If we simply run an OLS regression like equation (2.1), the estimated γ1
may be biased, because the educational attainment Eict and the error term μ
are potentially correlated. To illustrate, a woman with higher intelligence may
obtain more schooling and achieve better marital outcomes. The exogenous
policy change can help us to address the endogeneity problem. Specifically,
the policy dummy Tic is a valid IV for educational attainment Eict, because it
is correlated with educational attainment Eict but uncorrelated with the error
term μ.
For the first stage equation, we compute the optimal bandwidth h∗1; for the
second stage equation, we compute the optimal bandwidth h∗2. For simplicity,
as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we can choose the smaller one
of the two bandwidths as the common bandwidth of equations (2.1) and (2.2)
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(h∗ = min(h∗1, h
∗
2)). Combining equation (2.1) and (2.2), we can estimate γ1
by 2SLS within the optimal bandwidth h∗, using Tic as the excluded instru-
ment for the endogenous educational attainment. Here γ1 captures the Local
Average Treatment Effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) on the compliers (peo-
ple who would stay in school till age 16 if required by the law and leave school
at 15 otherwise).
2.3.3 Identification assumption
The key RD assumption is that the conditional expectations of the potential
outcomes are all continuous at the cutoff point in the absence of the policy
change. Then we can attribute any discontinuities we find to the effect of the
policy change. This assumption means: (1) all of the predetermined variables,
observable or unobservable, are continuous at the cutoff; (2) individuals cannot
fully manipulate the assignment variable, i.e., the month-year birth cohort.
We take two steps to check the validity of this assumption. First, we check
the continuity of the pre-determined variables. If the observable variables are
continuous at the cutoff, we tend to believe the unobservable variables are also
continuous at the cutoff. We test the continuity of three observable variables:
the proportion of females, the proportion of whites, and age at the time of
survey. Here the assignment variable is the month-year birth cohort. For each
cohort, we calculate the mean of these variables, and we check whether there
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is discontinuity in the cohort mean at the cutoff. Aside from this, we also plot
the fitted values from local linear regressions within the optimal bandwidth
chosen by CCT (2014). In Figure 2.2, the upper left panel checks whether there
is a discontinuity in the proportion of females;9 the upper right panel checks
whether there is a discontinuity in the proportion of whites; and the lower
left panel checks whether there is a discontinuity in age. It is not surprising
that we do not find any discontinuity at the cutoff point for these variables, as
shown in Figure 2.2. Second, we check whether there is manipulation of the
assignment variable by checking its density. We do not find any evidence of
manipulation, as shown in the lower right panel of Figure 2.2. To summarize,
the cohorts just below and just above the cutoff are comparable, and there is no
manipulation of the assignment variable, suggesting that our RD assumption
is valid.
Our identification is based on comparisons between the marriage outcomes
of the cohorts right above and right below the cutoff. So we need to assume
that the two cohorts are competing in a common market for husbands. This
assumption is not too strong because the age difference between the two co-
horts is only one month.
9In our sample, the proportion of females is about 0.51 and proportion of male is about
0.49. In the figure, the proportion of females is around 0.59, which is because there are more
missing values in the “month of birth” variable for males.
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2.4 Data
General Household Survey (GHS) was a continuous annual national survey
of people living in private households in Great Britain. It was conducted by
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and ran from 1972 to 2011.10 The
main aim of the survey was to collect data on a range of core topics, covering
household, family and individual information. The households were selected
randomly each year. In the paper, we group individuals by their month-year
birth cohort. Thus, only the surveys which contain the information about
month and year of birth are used. These surveys are from 1982 to 2001.11
2.4.1 Measure for educational attainment
In the survey, individuals were asked about their terminal age of full time
education. The maximum age by which children must start to attend school
in the UK is currently five. Thus, the completed years of schooling equals to
the age at which an individual left full time education minus five.
2.4.2 Measure for marital outcomes
In this paper we are interested in the following marital outcomes: the probabil-
ity of marriage, the age at first marriage, the age difference between husband
10The GHS has been carried out continuously every year, except for breaks in 1997–1998
when the survey was reviewed, and 1999–2000 when the survey was redeveloped.
11The latest survey data sets are not available to researchers outside the UK.
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and wife, and marital instability. In the data, there is information about the
age at first marriage and the age of the spouse. The current marital status con-
sists of five categories: married, single (never married), divorced, separated,
and widowed. Unfortunately, there is no information about marriage history,
so we do not know whether the current marriage is the first marriage or not.
2.4.3 Summary statistics
In the RD design, only the observations near the cutoff are useful. Thus,
the sample is chosen based on the year of birth of the subjects. First, we
choose the subjects who were born between 1945 and 1970. This provides us
with 159, 856 observations, among which there are 81,309 females.12 Then we
delete 12,855 observations with missing information from the female sample.
Excluding 13,464 observations who were younger than 25 at the time of survey
gives us a sample of 54,990 observations. Lastly, dropping 1,025 outliers who
claimed they left full-time education before age 10 or after age 30, we have a
sample of 53,965 observations, which is our full sample.
The upper panel of Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics for the full sam-
ple. Their ages range between 25 and 66, with a mean of 35. The proportion
of whites is about 94%, and the proportion of immigrants is about 8.7%. The
12In the sample, the proportion of female is about 0.51 and proportion of male is about
0.49.
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sample has very good representativeness since the statistics are very close to
the census estimates.13 The average years of schooling is about 12. Regarding
marital status, about 17% of the subjects have never been married before, 72%
are currently married, about 7% are divorced, 3% are separated, and about 1%
are widowed. The mean age at first marriage is about 22. For those who are
currently married, the mean age of the husbands is 38, and the husbands are
about 2.5 years older than the wives on average. The husbands have similar
years of schooling to the wives.
According to the method proposed by CCT (2014), the optimal bandwidth
is 41, so subjects born between April 1954 and January 1961 are included in the
“discontinuity sample”. The lower panel shows the summary statistics for this
“discontinuity sample”, which is used in the baseline estimation. Immigrants
are excluded since we cannot calculate the completed years of schooling for
them.14 About 98% are white, the proportion being high because we only
keep those who were born in the UK. The characteristics of the subjects in the
discontinuity sample are similar to those in the full sample, except that they
13In the 2001 census, the percentage of immigrants is about 8.3 and the percentage of white
is about 92.12. Our sample statistics are reasonable because the surveys were conducted in
the 1980s and 1990s, when the proportion of white was a little bit higher.
14There are two reasons why the immigrants are excluded. First, we do not know when
they arrived in the UK, so we cannot decide whether they are affected by the law or not.
Second, the immigrants come from different countries, and they may start school at different
ages in their home countries. So we cannot calculate the completed years of schooling for
the immigrants.
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are about 2.6 years younger on average.
2.5 Results
In this section, the estimation results are reported and discussed. Firstly, we
look at the first stage results, i.e., the impact of the 1972 law change on years
of schooling for females. Secondly, we investigate the effects of education on
marital outcomes.
2.5.1 First stage
First, we examine the impact of the 1972 compulsory schooling law change
on female years of schooling. In Figure 2.3, the dots represent the month-
year birth cohort means of the years of schooling, and the red line denotes
the cutoff. The fitted values from the local linear regressions as well as 95%
confidence intervals are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. We can observe
the significant jump in years of schooling at the cutoff, and the confidence
intervals do not overlap with each other at the cutoff.
To estimate the exact effect of the compulsory schooling law change on
female years of schooling, we regress female years of schooling on the “Law
change” dummy and the other control variables, allowing for different linear
trends on the two sides of the cutoff. The estimation results are reported in
Table 2.2. The optimal bandwidth chosen by CCT (2014) is 41, so we include
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subjects who were born between April 1954 and January 1961 in regression (1).
The estimated coefficient is 0.34 and it is significant at the 1% significance level.
We check the robustness of the first stage results by varying the bandwidths.
From column (2) to column (5), the bandwidths used are 53, 47, 35, and 29
months respectively. The estimated coefficients are all statistically significant,
and the magnitudes range between 0.27 and 0.33. Thus, the first stage results
are not sensitive to the choice of bandwidths. To conclude, the change of
compulsory schooling law in 1972 increased female education by about 0.34
years.
2.5.2 Marital outcomes
Four kinds of marital outcomes are examined in this section: the probability
of never being married, age at the time of first marriage, the age difference
between husband and wife, and the probability of being currently divorced or
separated.
Probability of never being married
First, we check whether educational attainment affects the probability of mar-
riage. Now we examine the relationship between birth cohort and probabil-
ity of never being married visually. In Figure 2.4, the x-axis denotes the
month-year birth cohort; the vertical red line stands for the cutoff; the y-
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axis represents the probability of never being married; each dot represents the
month-year cohort mean. The fitted values from local linear regressions are
plotted separately on both sides of the cutoff. Figure 2.4 shows that there is no
discontinuity at the cutoff, and the 95% confidence intervals overlap with each
other. Here we do not find any visual evidence that educational attainment
influences the probability of never being married.
We estimate the effects of education on the probability of never being mar-
ried by running OLS and 2SLSL regressions. In Table 2.3, the OLS estimation
results are reported in column (1) and the 2SLS estimation results are reported
in columns (2) to (6). The optimal bandwidth is 41 months, so subjects who
were born between April 1954 and January 1961 are included in baseline re-
gressions (1) and (2). In column (1), the estimated coefficient is significant at
the 1% significance level, and the magnitude is around 0.015, implying that
one more year of schooling is associated with a 1.5 percentage points increase
in the probability of never being married. Although the estimate is statistically
significant, the magnitude is relatively small, indicating that the association is
weak. By contrast, the 2SLS estimate in column (2) is insignificant at the 10%
significance level, and the magnitude is close to 0. We check the robustness
of the effects by varying bandwidths. From column (3) to column (6), the
bandwidths used are 53, 47, 35, and 29 months respectively. The coefficients
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are all very small, and none of them are statistically significant at the 10%
significance level. The 2SLS estimates are in contrast to the OLS estimates,
suggesting that education may not affect the probability of never being mar-
ried. The results imply that the increasing educational level is unlikely to be
responsible for the increase in the proportion of people who are never married.
Age at first marriage
Now we explore whether education can influence the timing of marriage. We
first check the relationship between age at first marriage and the month-year
birth cohort visually. In Figure 2.5, each dot represents the cohort mean of
the age at first marriage. Fitted values of local linear regressions, as well as
95% confidence intervals, are plotted on both sides of the cutoff. There is a
small jump in the linear predictions at the cutoff, but the confidence intervals
overlap a little bit. From the figure, it is not very clear whether more education
postpones the age at first marriage.
We estimate the effect of education on the age at first marriage by running
OLS and 2SLS regressions. In Table 2.4, the OLS and 2SLS estimation results
are reported in column (1) and columns (2) to (6) respectively. The optimal
bandwidth is 41 months, so subjects who were born between April 1954 and
January 1961 are included in the baseline regressions (1) and (2). In column
(1), the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level, and
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the magnitude is around 0.4. The results imply that one additional year of
schooling is associated with a 0.4 years delay in the first marriage. However,
the problem with OLS estimation is that omitted variables such as patience
or preference may affect both the educational attainment and the age at first
marriage. For example, patient people may achieve more years of schooling
and spend more time in finding a spouse before getting married. In contrast,
the 2SLS estimate is insignificant at the 10% significance level, although the
magnitude is comparable to that of the OLS estimation.
Furthermore, we check the robustness of the results by changing the band-
widths. From column (3) to column (6), the bandwidths used are 53, 47, 35,
and 29 months respectively. None of the estimated coefficients are statisti-
cally significant at the 10% significance level, and the coefficient even becomes
negative in column (6). To conclude, our 2SLS estimation results suggest the
effect of education on the age at first marriage is insignificant.
Age gap of the couple
In this section we explore whether the years of schooling affect the age differ-
ence of the couple. To explore the effect of education on the age difference, we
first examine the relationship between age difference and the month-year birth
cohort visually in Figure 2.6. Each dot stands for the cohort mean of the age
difference. The fitted values of local linear regressions are plotted separately
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on the two sides of the cutoff. The figure shows that there is a significant drop
at the cutoff, and the confidence intervals do not overlap with each other.
For women who are currently married, their husbands’ education may also
affect the age gap of the couple. So we need to check whether there is a
discontinuity in husbands’ education. If there is no discontinuity in husbands’
education, then we can attribute the discontinuity in age gap to the effect of
women’s own education. Figure 2.7 shows that there is no discontinuity in the
husband’s education. This is possible because many women right above the
cutoff marry slightly older men, who are not affected by the new compulsory
schooling law. It is also consistent with our identification assumption that
women right above and right below the cutoff are competing in a common
market for husbands.
We now check the effects of education on the age difference by running OLS
and 2SLS regressions. In Table 2.5, the OLS and 2SLS estimation results are
reported in column (1) and columns (2) to (6) respectively. The optimal band-
width is 41 months, so subjects who were born between April 1954 and January
1961 are included in the baseline regressions (1) and (2). In column (1), the
OLS estimate is significant at the 1% significance level, and the magnitude is
around 0.08, indicating that one additional year of schooling is associated with
a 0.08 years decrease in the age gap of the couple. The estimated coefficient
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in column (2) is significant at the 5% significance level, and the magnitude is
around -1.4. To test the robustness, we use varying bandwidths around the
optimal bandwidth. From column (3) to column (6), the bandwidths used are
53, 47, 35, and 29 months respectively. The estimated coefficients are all sig-
nificant, and the magnitudes range between -1.7 and -1.4. The results here are
not sensitive to the selection of bandwidths. To conclude, our 2SLS estimation
results imply that one additional year of schooling reduces the age gap of the
couple by about 1.4 years. Here, our 2SLS estimates are much larger than the
OLS estimates, which is possible because 2SLS estimates capture the effects
on the compliers and the effects on the compliers may be large (Oreopoulos,
2006).
Marital instability
Here we would like to examine whether more education reduces marriage insta-
bility for women. Specifically, we investigate whether more schooling reduces
the probability of being divorced or separated. We first check the relationship
between birth cohort and the probability of being divorced or separated vi-
sually. In Figure 2.8, each dot represents the cohort mean, and fitted values
of the local linear regressions are plotted separately on the two sides of the
cutoff. The figure shows that there is a moderate jump at the cutoff in the
linear predictions, but the confidence intervals overlap a little bit at the cutoff.
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We cannot draw a conclusion at this stage because the visual evidence is not
very clear.
We assess the effect of education on the probability of being divorced or
separated by running OLS and 2SLS regressions. In Table 2.6, the OLS and
2SLS estimation results are reported in column (1) and columns (2) to (6)
respectively. The optimal bandwidth is 41 months, so subjects who were born
between April 1954 and January 1961 are included in the baseline regressions
(1) and (2). In column (1), the OLS estimate is significant at the 1% signif-
icance level, and the magnitude is around 0.01. The OLS estimate indicates
that one more year of schooling is associated with a 1 percentage point de-
crease in the probability of being divorced or separated. But we cannot draw
any causal inference from the OLS estimates since there is a potential endo-
geneity problem. For instance, women with higher intelligence may obtain
more schooling, and they may also be good at dealing with conflicts within
marriage and maintaining marital relationship. So the OLS estimates may be
upward biased.
In column (2), the 2SLS estimate becomes positive, although it is not
statistically significant at the 10% significance level. We check the robustness
by varying the bandwidths. From column (3) to column (6), the bandwidths
used are 53, 47, 35, and 29 months respectively. None of the 2SLS estimates are
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statistically significant at the 10% significance level, and they are all positive.
The 2SLS estimation results do not support the claim that more education
reduces marital instability.
2.6 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter examines the impact of education on marital outcomes by ex-
ploiting the increase in women’s schooling induced by the implementation of
a new compulsory schooling law in the UK in 1972, which raised the school
leaving age from 15 to 16. We find that education has little effect on the
probability of marriage, which is consistent with the findings of Lefgren and
McIntyre (2006) and Anderberg and Zhu (2014). Also, we find that the effect
of education on the age at first marriage is insignificant.
Bu we do find that female education reduces the age gap of the couple.
Specifically, one additional year of schooling reduces the age gap of the couple
by about 1.4 years. Here, the 2SLS estimates are large, which may be because
the effects on the compliers are large (Oreopoulos, 2006). The results imply
that education may contribute to the positive assortative mating in terms of
age. If women marry their secondary school classmates, the age difference of
the couple will be very small. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis
directly because there is no information about how the couples came to know
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each other. Nevertheless, some previous studies indeed document that many
women meet their husbands as they attend high school or college (Mare, 1991;
Goldin, 1992). In addition, women with more schooling may have fewer age-
diverse social networks at ages when marriages most often form (Mansour and
McKinnish, 2014).
We fail to find evidence that more schooling makes women enjoy more sta-
ble marriages. This finding is in contrast to those of Lefgren and McIntyre
(2006) and Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011), which document that the mar-
riage dissolution rate might be lower among the well educated. Actually, it is
possible that more education may increase the probability of divorce or sepa-
ration. Because more schooling improves women’s income and makes women
more economically independent, they are more likely to terminate the mar-
riage when they find the current marriage is a mismatch. It is well documented
that education can increase the wage rate and earnings. Specifically, utilizing
the same compulsory schooling law, Grenet (2013) finds that one additional
year of schooling increases the hourly wage rate by 6–7% in the UK. Women’s
labor income may affect their marriage-market behavior. In the US, Weiss and
Willis (1997) find that women with high earning capacity are more likely to
divorce; Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) find that for cohorts born between 1950
and 1955, women with a college degree have lower remarriage rate compared
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to those without a college degree. They argue that women with more edu-
cation are better equipped to cope outside of marriage. Consistent with this
argument, it is documented that receiving welfare or pension could reduce the
remarriage rate of the divorced women. For example, Bahr (1979) finds that
among the low income women, welfare recipients are less likely to remarry af-
ter divorce, compared to those without welfare. In addition, Salisbury (2014)
finds that receiving the civil war pension reduced the hazard rate of remarriage
by about 25 percent for the widows of the Union Army soldiers.
Does more schooling “hurt” women if they are more likely to divorce?
Assuming individuals are rational, they marry because they could get better
off compared with remaining single; and they divorce because they get better
off compared with staying married. If the current marriage does not work
well, then terminating it is not an irrational option. Indeed, using the British
Household Panel Survey, Gardner and Oswald (2006) find that both men and
women are happier one year after the divorce than they were while being
married.
According to the report by Office for National Statistics (2014), there are
several stylized facts for marriages in England and Wales. One fact is that
the numbers of men and women delaying marriage or not marrying at all are
increasing. Specifically, the mean age at first marriage in 2012 has increased
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by almost eight years for both men and women since 1972.15 The general
marriage rate dropped from near 80 in 1972 to 23 in 2012 for males, and
from about 60 in 1972 to 21 in 2012 for females.16 Our findings do not imply
that the increase in average educational level did not play any role in these
changes, since our estimates only apply to the compliers who were forced to
stay in school for one additional year at the secondary school level. Further
research is needed to explore the role that increased average education level
played in these changes.
15The mean age at first marriage has increased from 24.9 to 32.4 for men, and 22.9 to
30.3 for women.
16The general marriage rate is the number of marriages per thousand unmarried males or
females aged 16 and over.
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Figure 2.1: Age of leaving full time education by month-year birth cohort
Notes: All of the individuals born between 1945 and 1970 are included. The hor-
izontal axis represents the month-year birth cohort. The upper line represents the
proportion of leaving school by age 16, while the lower line represents the proportion
of leaving school by age 15. Each dot represents the month-year birth cohort mean.
The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 2.2: Balancing check
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths in the first three figures, where
each dot represents the month-year birth cohort mean. The last figure shows the
density of observations within the optimal bandwidths. The vertical line denotes the
cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 2.3: Impact of law change on educational attainment
Notes: The data is from General Household Survey 1982-2001. The fitted values of
these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence intervals, are plotted within
the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-year birth cohort mean. The
vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 2.4: Effects of education on the probability of being never married
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-
year birth cohort mean. The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 2.5: Effects of education on age of first marriage
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-
year birth cohort mean. The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 2.6: Effects of education on the age difference of the couple
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-
year birth cohort mean. The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 2.7: Effects of female education on the husband’s education
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-
year birth cohort mean. The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Figure 2.8: Effects of education on the probability of being divorced or sepa-
rated
Notes: The fitted values of these local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted within the chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the month-
year birth cohort mean. The vertical line denotes the cutoff—September 1957.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Full sample
Age 53,965 35.11 6.748 25 56
White 53,965 0.940 0.238 0 1
Age left school 53,965 17.20 2.859 10 30
Never married 53,965 0.165 0.371 0 1
Married 53,965 0.722 0.448 0 1
Divorced 53,965 0.0722 0.259 0 1
Separated 53,965 0.0333 0.179 0 1
Widowed 53,965 0.00782 0.0881 0 1
Age at first marriage 44,504 21.76 3.690 15 49
Age of spouse 41,916 38.05 7.864 18 85
Age gap 41,916 2.632 4.594 -24 39
Year of birth 53,965 1955 6.570 1945 1970
Month of birth 53,710 6.348 3.414 1 12
Survey year 53,965 1991 5.056 1982 2001
Immigrant 53,965 0.0869 0.282 0 1
Discontinuity sample
Age 15,248 32.52 4.934 25 46
White 15,248 0.984 0.125 0 1
Years of schooling 15,248 12.25 2.706 6 25
Never married 15,248 0.169 0.374 0 1
Married 15,248 0.723 0.448 0 1
Divorced 15,248 0.0699 0.255 0 1
Separated 15,248 0.0347 0.183 0 1
Widowed 15,248 0.00393 0.0626 0 1
Age at first marriage 12,647 21.55 3.642 15 45
Age of spouse 11,810 35.26 6.495 18 74
Age gap 11,810 2.644 4.508 -18 38
Year of birth 15,248 1957 1.975 1954 1961
Month of birth 15,248 6.446 3.394 1 12
Survey year 15,248 1990 4.865 1982 2001
Notes: The upper panel shows the summary statistics for the full sample, including
all of the females who were born between 1945 and 1970. The lower panel shows the
summary statistics for the discontinuity sample, including females who were born
between April 1954 and January 1961 (Because the cutoff is September 1957, and
the optimal bandwidth is 41 months). Immigrants are excluded because we cannot
calculate their completed years of schooling.
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Table 2.2: Impacts of the 1972 law on female educational attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bandwidths (months) 41 53 47 35 29
VARIABLES Years of schooling
Law change 0.3391*** 0.3300*** 0.3013*** 0.2936*** 0.2710**
(0.0868) (0.0783) (0.0798) (0.0894) (0.1042)
White -0.3073* -0.4855*** -0.3277* -0.1433 -0.2454
(0.1745) (0.1735) (0.1659) (0.1915) (0.2256)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,248 19,428 17,284 13,005 10,736
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 41, so subjects who were
born between April 1954 and January 1961 are included in regression (1). The bandwidths
used in regressions (2) to (5) are 53, 47, 35, and 29 months respectively. “Law change”
is a dummy, which equals 1 if the individual is subject to the new compulsory schooling
law. Cohort trend includes the assignment variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its
interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the month-
year birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 2.3: Effects of education on the probability of being never married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS
Bandwidths (months) 41 53 47 35 29
Years of schooling 0.0153*** -0.0015 -0.0165 -0.0003 -0.0249 -0.0203
(0.0011) (0.0324) (0.0295) (0.0329) (0.0445) (0.0456)
Age -0.0198*** -0.0144 -0.0195** -0.0211* -0.0071 -0.0033
(0.0073) (0.0115) (0.0099) (0.0114) (0.0149) (0.0154)
Age squared 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
White -0.1895*** -0.1946*** -0.1835*** -0.1787*** -0.1836*** -0.2023***
(0.0239) (0.0349) (0.0337) (0.0324) (0.0363) (0.0437)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,248 15,248 19,428 17,284 13,005 10,736
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 41, so subjects who were born between
April 1954 and January 1961 are included in the baseline regressions (1) and (2). The bandwidths used
in regressions (3) to (6) are 53, 47, 35, and 29 months respectively. Cohort trend includes the assignment
variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors
are clustered at the month-year birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 2.4: Effects of education on the age of first marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS
Bandwidths (months) 41 53 47 35 29
Years of schooling 0.4410*** 0.4350 0.3143 0.4248 0.2443 -0.1656
(0.0119) (0.3625) (0.3293) (0.4125) (0.5101) (0.5603)
White -0.7853*** -0.7861** -0.9014*** -0.9354*** -0.7115** -0.9616**
(0.2830) (0.3325) (0.2847) (0.2971) (0.3533) (0.4289)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,647 12,647 16,061 14,316 10,774 8,905
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 41, so subjects who were born between
April 1954 and January 1961 are included in the baseline regressions (1) and (2). The bandwidths used
in regressions (3) to (6) are 53, 47, 35, and 29 months respectively. Cohort trend includes the assignment
variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors
are clustered at the month-year birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *,
p<0.1.
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Table 2.5: Effects of education on the age difference of the couple
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS
Bandwidths (months) 41 53 47 35 29
Years of schooling -0.0847*** -1.3511** -1.4057** -1.6574** -1.6474* -1.5917*
(0.0157) (0.5932) (0.5662) (0.7775) (0.8954) (0.9011)
White -0.6801* -0.7018 -0.6848 -0.6920 -0.7916 -1.1530
(0.3899) (0.5022) (0.4585) (0.4942) (0.5813) (0.7204)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,976 10,976 13,865 12,394 9,331 7,708
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 41, so subjects who were born
between April 1954 and January 1961 are included in the baseline regressions (1) and (2). The
bandwidths used in regressions (3) to (6) are 53, 47, 35, and 29 months respectively. Cohort trend
includes the assignment variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change”
dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year birth cohort level. Significance levels are:
***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: Effects of education on the probability of being divorced or sepa-
rated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS
Bandwidths (months) 41 53 47 35 29
Years of schooling -0.0100*** 0.0577 0.0002 0.0452 0.0683 0.0552
(0.0011) (0.0357) (0.0333) (0.0422) (0.0478) (0.0532)
Age -0.0059 -0.0296* -0.0078 -0.0255 -0.0379* -0.0278
(0.0071) (0.0175) (0.0136) (0.0181) (0.0213) (0.0221)
Age squared 0.0002** 0.0005** 0.0002 0.0005* 0.0006** 0.0005*
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
White -0.0546** -0.0468 -0.0459 -0.0424 -0.0300 -0.0419
(0.0267) (0.0317) (0.0280) (0.0285) (0.0313) (0.0384)
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,677 12,677 16,098 14,351 10,790 8,911
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 41, so subjects who were born
between April 1954 and January 1961 are included in the baseline regressions (1) and (2). The
bandwidths used in regressions (3) to (6) are 53, 47, 35, and 29 months respectively. Cohort trend
includes the assignment variable Z (month-year birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law
change” dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year birth cohort level. Significance
levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Chapter 3




Trust is one of the two key measures of social capital (Putnam, 1995). It
plays an important role in the modern economy, as it facilitates cooperation
and coordination among people and allows a society to avoid inefficient non-
cooperative traps. An extensive literature has documented that trust promotes
economic growth (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and
Knack, 2001) and financial development (Guiso et al., 2004, 2008). In addition,
trust supports a larger firm size by increasing decentralized decision making
(Bloom et al., 2012). Trust, especially political trust, is crucial for political
stability and government performance (Newton, 1997; Tavits, 2006). Last but
not least, trust enhances subjective well-being (Helliwell and Wang, 2011).
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The level of social trust may be declining in our societies. For instance,
Putnam (1995) finds that social capital declined dramatically from the 1960s
to the 1990s in the US. First, the proportion of people who claimed that
“most people can be trusted” dropped from 58% in 1960 to 37% in 1993.
Social engagement was also declining: bonds within families were loosening;
there were fewer interactions between neighbors; the number of association
memberships was shrinking dramatically. To understand the decline in social
trust, we need to know the determinants of trust.
Education is widely believed to be one of the key contributing factors for
trust and social capital (Helliwell and Putnam, 2007; Nannestad, 2008; Bor-
gonovi, 2012). Education is important because it can improve political and
social engagement, such as voting participation (Dee, 2004; Milligan et al.,
2004). In addition, at the individual level, trust is treated as personal prefer-
ence or attitude. A positive correlation between education and trust has been
documented by many studies (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011; Hooghe et al.,
2012; Schoon et al., 2010; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).
However, a major challenge facing researchers is that both education and
trust are endogenous, as educational attainment and trust measures could
be driven by some common factors that are difficult to measure and control
for. At the individual level, ability or intelligence may influence both schooling
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attainment and trusting behavior. For instance, both Hooghe et al. (2012) and
Schoon et al. (2010) document that cognitive ability is positively correlated
with trust. At the family level, individuals with better family background may
achieve more schooling and are more likely to express trust towards others.
For example, Schoon et al. (2010) find that parental social class is positively
correlated with children’s political trust. At the community level, people living
in better communities may obtain more education and may find it easier to
express trust in others. Indeed, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that people
from communities with higher median household income are more likely to
trust others.
If we assume omitted variables positively affect both educational attain-
ment and trust measure, the OLS estimates should be upward biased.1 Hence,
we cannot draw any causal inferences between education and trust from OLS
estimations. Using compulsory schooling laws as IV for educational attain-
ment, Milligan et al. (2004) examine the effect of education on trust in people
and federal government in the US, as part of a larger study focusing on civic
participation. The estimated coefficient for trust in people is only significant
at the 10% significance level, and that for trust in government is insignificant.
1It is reasonable to assume that the omitted variable is positively correlated with the
educational attainment and trust measures, because it is supported by many empirical
findings, as discussed in section 2.1.
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The authors do not show the robustness of these estimates because their main
interest is voting participation.
Using data sets from the British Social Attitudes Survey, this chapter esti-
mates the causal effect of education on trust—both generalized trust (trust in
others) and political trust (trust in politicians and government). To address
the endogeneity problem, we apply the Regression Discontinuity (RD) design.
The exogenous variation in educational attainment is induced by the change
of compulsory schooling law in the UK in 1972, which raised the school leaving
age from 15 to 16.
This chapter finds that the change of compulsory schooling law in 1972
increased the years of schooling of the affected birth cohorts by about 0.25
years. In the RD estimations, the effects of education on the three trust
measures—trust in people, trust in politicians, and trust in government, are
all statistically insignificant. By contrast, in the OLS estimations, education
and all of the three trust measures are positively and significantly correlated.
These results imply that the OLS estimates may suffer from omitted variable
bias. Thus, education may not necessarily “foster” trust.
This chapter is related to two strands of literature. The first strand of
literature investigates the determinants of social capital and attempts to un-
derstand how social capital could be improved (Helliwell and Putnam, 2007).
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The second strand of literature explores the effect of education on individual
preferences and attitudes (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). By comparing the
OLS and RD estimates, this paper is able to check whether the OLS esti-
mates are biased or not. The difference between the OLS and RD estimates
implies the importance of using some IV method when investigating the effect
of education on trust.
This chapter develops as the following. Section 3.2 discusses the channels
and introduces the educational background of the UK; Section 3.3 describes
the estimation strategy; Section 3.4 describes the data and gives the sum-
mary statistics; Section 3.5 reports the estimation results; and the last section
concludes the paper and discusses some relevant issues.
3.2 Background
In this section, we first discuss the relationship between attitudinal trust and
behavioral trust; then we examine the potential channels through which edu-
cation can influence trust; lastly, we provide information for the educational
background of the UK.
3.2.1 Attitudinal and behavioral trust
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of trust measures: attitudinal trust
and behavioral trust. In this chapter, we focus on the attitudinal measure of
94
trust. Do the answers to this attitudinal questions really predict the trusting
behavior? To answer this question, researchers need to build a bridge between
surveys and experiments. Combining surveys and experiments conducted on
Harvard undergraduates, Glaeser et al. (2000) find that answers to the attitu-
dinal questions actually predict the trustworthiness of the respondents, rather
than their trusting behavior in the trust game.2 In contrast, by integrating
the behavioral experiments into the representative surveys in a German study,
Fehr et al. (2003) find that questions about people’s trust and past trusting
behavior are good predictors of trusting behavior. They also find that none
of the survey measures of trust predict trustworthiness in the experiment. In
addition, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) argue that a literal interpretation
of the answer to the trust question is proper, because they find that some
exogenous traumas or misfortune in the past year negatively affect “trust”,
suggesting that the answer to the trust question should not be a pure measure
of the trustworthiness of the respondents.3 To conclude, the answer to the
trust question can be used to measure trust, as pointed out by Alesina and La
Ferrara (2002).
2However, Glaeser et al. (2000) may suffer from some weakness. As the authors have
admitted, the number of observations is small and the standard errors may be large. For
example, in their Table 3 and 5, there are only around 90 observations.
3If the answer to the trust question only captures the trustworthiness of the respondent,
it should not be influenced by the exogenous traumas or misfortune in the past year.
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3.2.2 Education and trust
Education and generalized trust
Trust consists of two parts, according to Sapienza et al. (2013). The first part
is belief or expectation of others’ trustworthiness; the second part is preference,
which may be related to risk aversion, altruism, etc. There are many channels
through which education can influence trust. Firstly, trust is encouraged by
teachers and schools, as it is pro-social behavior. As argued by Newton (1997),
schools help students to understand the ideas of citizenship, trust, fairness, etc.
Secondly, individuals can acquire knowledge and analytical thinking ability in
school (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011), which can influence their calculation
of others’ trustworthiness. Intelligence can help the actors to determine more
accurately the motivations of the others. The effect of ability or intelligence
on trust could be ambiguous.
Last but not the least, education can influence trust by changing indi-
viduals’ social status. It is well documented that education can improve in-
dividuals’ wage and income (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1999, 2001;
Oreopoulos, 2006) and promote their socioeconomic status (Oreopoulos and
Salvanes, 2011).4 But how social status affects trust may be inconclusive.
Some studies indicate that people in high social status may find it easier to
4In Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011), the socioeconomic status is measured by occupation
prestige, the probability of being unemployed, the probability of being welfare recipient, etc.
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express trust towards others because they are in more privileged positions in
society. For instance, Hooghe et al. (2012) find that personal occupational
prestige is positively correlated with generalized trust. However, the corre-
lation cannot represent causal effect because social status is endogenous, in
the sense that omitted intelligence or family background could be correlated
with both social status and attitudinal trust. Actually, it is possible that high
social status reduces trust in others. If people tend to protect themselves from
undesirable realities, people in higher positions of society may place less trust
in others. Consistent with this hypothesis, Schilke et al. (2015) find that in the
social exchange games, the subjects with more power exhibit less perceptual
and behavioral trust in others. To conclude, it is possible that more schooling
decreases trust in others.
Education and political trust
There is a slight difference between political trust and generalized trust. Gen-
eralized trust relates more to the face-to-face interactions with the other peo-
ple, while the political trust is based on the perception of the trustworthiness
of the political system. Thus, expressing political trust needs more abstract
reasoning than expressing generalized trust (Hooghe et al., 2012).
Firstly, education may affect political trust through “sorting”. More school-
ing provides access to more privileged positions, which makes it easier for these
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“winners” to express trust in the political system (Newton, 1997; Campbell,
2009). Indeed, Hooghe et al. (2012) and Schoon et al. (2010) find that oc-
cupational prestige is positively correlated with political trust. Besides, in
well-established democracies, education helps individuals to understand the
political system in a more profound way (Hillygus, 2005). Because citizens
understand the system better, they are more likely to trust and support the
political system (Huang et al., 2011). However, it is also possible that ed-
ucation reduces political trust if education makes individuals more critical.
As argued by Hooghe (2011), in well-established democracies, we do expect
that there are critical citizens who display some kind of distrust in politicians.
Hence, more schooling may not necessarily increase political trust.
3.2.3 Education in the UK
In England and Wales, the school term starts in September, and children need
to enroll in a primary school when they reach age 5 by August 31. The British
compulsory schooling law was changed twice in the last century. The first one
took place in 1947, which increased the minimum school leaving age from 14
to 15; and the second one happened in 1972, which raised it from 15 to 16. We
focus on the second change in 1972. This is mostly because our data contains
very limited observations whose schooling were not affected by the first reform.
The new law was approved by the House of Parliament on March 22, 1972 and
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implemented on September 1, 1972 (Statutory Instruments 1972 No. 444).
The new law compelled students to stay in school until grade ten, sit for “O”
level examinations and obtain the Certificate of Secondary Education.5
There are two kinds of birth cohorts used in the literature: the month-year
birth cohort and the year-of-birth cohort. Unfortunately, in the data, only the
year-of-birth information is available, so the year-of-birth cohort is adopted in
the paper.6 For the cohort born in 1957, only those born after September is
affected by the new law, the proportion affected is small. As shown in Figure
3.1, the proportion of people who left school by 15 did not drop significantly
for the 1957 cohort, while the proportion dropped dramatically for the 1958
cohort. Thus, the cohort born in 1958 serves as the cutoff in the paper.
According to the new compulsory schooling law, leaving full-time education
before 15 is illegal. So we expect the proportion of leaving school before 15
would drop dramatically after the new compulsory schooling law came into
effect. Figure 3.1 plots the proportions of leaving full-time education before
15, 16, and 17 respectively. It shows that the proportion of leaving school
5Enforcement of school attendance: If students are missing from school at compulsory
schooling age, the parents may be prosecuted and they may face a fine of up to 2,500 pounds,
a community order or a jail sentence up to 3 months.
6As argued by Clark and Royer (2013), the month-year birth cohort has two advantages
over the year-of-birth cohort. First, we can assign the treatment status more precisely.
Second, the cohorts on the two sides of the cutoff are more comparable, and the linear
trends work better in capturing the cohort trends. Unfortunately, we do not have the
month of birth information in the data. Nevertheless, the year-of-birth cohort method still
works well here, as that in Oreopoulos (2006).
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before 15 dropped substantially, from more than 30% to about 10%, within
two years after the implementation. While the proportions of leaving before 16
and 17 did not shrink correspondingly. Thus, the new compulsory law indeed
influenced the school leaving decision of the cohorts born after 1957.
3.3 Strategy
In this section, first we talk about the RD design method; then we discuss the
identification assumptions; lastly, we describe the estimation equations.
3.3.1 RD design
RD design is appealing here since the change of compulsory schooling law in
1972 generated variation in education attainment across the birth cohorts, and
there is a clear cutoff—September 1957. The cohorts born after the cutoff were
forced to stay in school for one more year, while those born before the cutoff
were not. Assuming the cohorts right above the cutoff and right below the
cutoff are comparable, we can use the outcome of observations right below the
cutoff as the counterfactual for those right above the cutoff.
Local linear regressions provide a nonparametric method which can esti-
mate the treatment effect consistently in an RD design (Hahn et al., 2001).
So local linear regression is used in the paper. To conduct the local linear
regression, we need to choose an “optimal” bandwidth, and then we run linear
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regressions within the optimal bandwidth. Several methods are proposed in
the literature for choosing the optimal bandwidth, such as Ludwig and Miller
(2007), Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), and Calonico et al. (2014) (CCT
(2014) for short from here on). Any of the three methods is acceptable. In this
chapter, all of the optimal bandwidths are chosen according to CCT (2014). 7
3.3.2 Estimation equations
We use the following equation to describe the relationship between educational
attainment and attitudinal trust:
Yict = γ0 + γ1 Eict + G(Zic, Tic) + γ2Xict + μict, (3.1)
where Yict denotes the trust measure of individual i in cohort c at time t;
Eict denotes years of schooling for individual i in cohort c at time t; γ1 is
the parameter of interest; Zic is the assignment variable (normalized year-
of-birth cohort relative to cutoff 1958); Tic is the policy dummy, indicating
whether an individual is subject to the new compulsory schooling law or not;
G(Z, T ) = b1Z + b2T ×Z, which allows for different trends on the two sides of
the cutoff; Xi represents observable characteristics of individual i; μ is the error
term, which captures all the unobservable factors which may affect attitudinal
7The three methods generate slightly different optimal bandwidths. But the choice of op-
timal bandwidth is not essential to the estimation, because we will use different bandwidths
in the robustness check.
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trust, including intelligence, family background, community characteristics,
etc.
We use the equation below to assess the impact of compulsory schooling
law change on the individual educational attainment:
Eict = α0 + α1Tic + F (Zic, Tic) + α2Xict + νict, (3.2)
where Eict denotes the years of schooling for individual i in cohort c at time
t; F (Z, T ) is similar to G(Z, T ), which allows for different trends on the two
sides of the cutoff; Xi denotes observable characteristics of individual i (gender,
age, ethnicity, region, survey year, etc.); ν is the error term, which captures
all the unobservable factors which may affect the years of schooling, including
personal intelligence, family background, etc.
If we run a simple OLS regression like equation (3.1), the estimated γ1
may be biased, because the educational attainment Eict and the error term μ
are potentially correlated. To illustrate, an individual growing up in a bet-
ter family may obtain more education and he/she is more likely to express
trust towards others. The exogenous policy change can help us to address the
endogeneity problem. Specifically, the policy dummy Tic is a valid IV for edu-
cational attainment Eict, because it is correlated with educational attainment
Eict but uncorrelated with the error term μ.
For the first stage equation, we compute the optimal bandwidth h∗1; for the
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second stage equation, we compute the optimal bandwidth h∗2. For simplicity,
as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we can choose the smaller one
of the two bandwidths as the common bandwidth of equations (3.1) and (3.2)
(h∗ = min(h∗1, h
∗
2)). Then combining equations (3.1) and (3.2), we can estimate
γ1 by 2SLS estimation within the optimal bandwidth h
∗, using Tic as excluded
instrument for educational attainment. Here γ1 captures the Local Average
Treatment Effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) on the compliers (people who
would stay in school till age 16 if required by the law and leave school at 15
otherwise). All of the standard errors are clustered at the year-of-birth cohort
level.
3.3.3 Identification assumption
The key RD assumption is that the conditional expectations of the potential
outcomes are all continuous at the cutoff point in the absence of the policy
change. Then we can attribute any discontinuities we find to the effect of the
policy change. This assumption means: (1) all of the predetermined variables,
observable or unobservable, are continuous at the cutoff; (2) individuals cannot
fully manipulate the running variable—year of birth.
We take two steps to check the validity of the assumption. First, we check
the continuity of the observable pre-determined variables. If the observable
variables are continuous at the cutoff, we tend to believe the unobservables are
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also continuous at the cutoff. We examine the continuity of four observable
variables: the proportions of females, asian, black, and the age at the survey.
It is not surprising that we do not find any discontinuity at the cutoff point
for these variables, as shown in Figure 3.2.
A straightforward way to check whether there is manipulation of the as-
signment variable is to check the density of the assignment variable. If there
is full manipulation, the number of observations on the two sides of the cutoff
will be unbalanced. In Figure 3.3, we check the density of the assignment
variable—year of birth. The figure shows that the density is quite symmetric
on the two sides of the cutoff. Thus, there is not any evidence for the existence
of manipulation.
3.4 Data
The British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey series began in 1983, which was
designed to produce annual measures of attitudinal movements. The survey is
conducted by NatCen Social Research—Britain’s leading center for inde-
pendent social research. The BSA has been conducted every year since 1983,
except in 1988 and 1992 when core funding was devoted to the British Elec-
tion Study (BES) series. The data contains information about demographic
characteristics, behavior patterns, and political attitudes.
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The survey data from 1983 to 2013 is publicly available. In this paper,
survey waves 1983–1985, 1989–1990, 1993, 1995, and 1999 are not used in
the estimations because none of the three trust questions are asked in these
surveys. In addition, although the trust questions are asked in the 1991 survey,
it contains no information about the ethnicity. So the 1991 survey is not used
in the estimations. There are also trust questions in the 2011 survey, but the
trust questions and the options are totally different from the other surveys.
As a result, the 2011 survey is not used either. The survey waves used in the
baseline estimation are displayed in Table 3.A1.
3.4.1 Measures of trust
The generalized trust refers to the trust in the other people. In this paper,
the measure of trust in people is derived from a survey question: “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot
be too careful in dealing with people?” This question is similar to that in the
World Values Survey (WVS) or that in the General Social Survey (GSS) in the
US. There are two options to the question: (1) Most people can be trusted ; (2)
Cannot be too careful in dealing with people. A dummy variable is constructed
with 1 representing “Most people can be trusted”.
In the literature, the measure of political trust is often derived from survey
questions which ask the respondents to rate their level of trust towards the
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political institutions such as government, police, and the justice department
(Marien, 2011; Hooghe et al., 2012, 2015). However, the citizens do not or
cannot distinguish between various political institutions when they rate their
trust. As argued by Hooghe (2011), political trust can be considered as a
comprehensive evaluation of the prevailing political culture of the political
system, rather than an evaluation of each institution separately. Hence, a
straightforward method is adopted to measure the political trust: only two
variables are constructed, one measuring trust in government and the other
measuring trust in politicians.
The measure of trust in politicians is derived from the question: “How
much do you trust politicians of any party in Britain to tell the truth when
they are in a tight corner?” There are four options: (1) Just about always;
(2) Most of the time; (3) Only some of the time; (4) Almost never. The
proportions of respondents who choose these four options are about 1%, 7%,
39%, and 53% respectively. A dummy variable is constructed, which equals
1 if the respondent chooses one of the first three options. Thus our outcome
variable “trust in politicians” means respondents trust that politicians would
tell the truth when they are in a tight corner, at least, some of the time.
Similarly, trust in government is derived from a survey question: “How
much do you trust British governments of any party to place the needs of the
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nation above the interests of their own political party?” There are also four
options as trust in the politicians. The proportions of respondents who choose
these four answers are about 2%, 22%, 51%, and 25% respectively. A dummy
variable is constructed, which equals 1 if the respondent chooses one of the first
three answers. Thus, the outcome variable “trust in government” means the
respondents trust that the governments would place the needs of the nation
above the interests of their own party, at least, some of the time.
3.4.2 Measure of educational attainment
In the survey, the educational attainment is measured by the age at which
individuals left full-time education. There are five categories: (a)15 or under;
(b)16; (c)17; (d)18; (e)19 or over. Thus, the school leaving age is treated as
15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 for these five categories respectively. This simplified
measure is not perfect, but the shortage does not bias our estimation since
RD design captures the effect on the compliers who postpone school leaving
age from 15 to 16 due to the new compulsory schooling law.
3.4.3 Summary statistics
Our original sample consists of 36,481 observations. According to CCT (2014),
the optimal bandwidth is 6 years.8 So we include the cohorts born between
8By the method of CCT (2014), the optimal bandwidths for years of schooling, trust in
people, trust in government, and trust in politicians are 6, 9, 9, and 9 respectively. For
convenience, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the smaller one, 6, is adopted as
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1952 and 1963 in the sample, which has 7,680 observations. Dropping 345 ob-
servations with missing information, we obtain our baseline sample with 7335
observations. The summary statistics for this sample is shown in Table 3.1. 9
On average, about 46% of the people claim that “most people can be trusted”;
47% of the respondents trust that the politicians would tell the truth when
they are in a tight corner, at least, some of the time; 73% of the respondents
trust that the governments would place the needs of the nation above the in-
terests of their own party, at least, some of the time. The average years of
schooling are 11.8. “Law change” dummy indicates whether the individuals
were subject to the new compulsory schooling law. In the sample, about 54%
of the respondents were subject to the new compulsory schooling law. The
proportion of females is about 54.5%, implying that women may be a little bit
over-sampled in the survey. Given that the sample is chosen based on the year
of birth, the average age of the respondents is about 46, with the minimum
23 and the maximum 61. Regarding the ethnicity, about 3.2% of the respon-
dents are the asian origin, 2.7% are black origin, and the remaining 94% are
whites. Regarding the region, 85% of the respondents are in England, 9% of
respondents are in Scotland, and the remaining 6% are in Wales.
the optimal bandwidth in the 2SLS estimations.
9The survey waves used in the baseline estimation and the number of observations in




Now we look into the effect of the 1972 compulsory schooling law on the
individual educational achievement. Figure 3.4 shows the mean of years of
schooling for each cohort from 1952 to 1963. And linear trends are fitted on
each side of the cutoff to capture the relationship between years of schooling
and the year-of-birth cohort. The optimal bandwidth is 6 according to the
method of CCT (2014). We can see there is a jump at the cutoff in the mean
of years of schooling, and the magnitude is about 0.25 years. This discontinuity
in the educational attainment across the cohorts can be attributed to the new
compulsory schooling law, given that the RD assumption is valid here.
Table 3.2 shows the estimation results for the first stage. Linear trends are
included in all of the six regressions. In column (1), only the “Law change”
dummy is added in the regression; in column (2), the dummy “Female” is
added; in column (3), “Age” and “Age squared” are added; in column (4),
dummies “Asian” and “Black” are added to control for the ethnicity; in column
(5), dummies “England” and “Scotland” are added to control for any possible
region heterogeneity; in column (6), the “Survey year” dummies are added.
Across all of the columns, the coefficients for schooling years are all significant
at 1% significance level, and the magnitudes are around 0.25.
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Now we show the results are robust to a range of bandwidths, i.e., the
results are not driven by the choice of bandwidth. In Table 3.A2, we check
the robustness of the first stage results by varying the bandwidths around the
“optimal bandwidth. In column (1), the baseline bandwidth 6 years is used for
the purpose of comparison. From column (2) to column (5), the bandwidths
adopted are 9, 8, 7, and 5 years respectively. The estimated effects range
between 0.16 and 0.25. We cannot use a even smaller bandwidth than 5
here because in that case we will have very few observations, which results in
rather imprecise estimates. Overall, the first stage results are not sensitive to
the choice of bandwidths.
3.5.2 Second stage
In this section, we examine the effect of education on three trust measures:
trust in people, politicians, and government. If the three measures are perfectly
correlated, we do not need to examine them separately. So we check the
correlations between the three trust measures first. The correlation between
trust in people and trust in government is 0.1, the correlation between trust
in people and trust in politicians is also 0.1, and the correlation between trust
in government and trust in politicians is 0.45. We can see that the correlation
between the generalized trust and political trust is weak, while the correlation
between the two political trust measures is stronger.
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Trust in people
Now we investigate the effect of education on the trust in people. Figure
3.5 shows the relationship between trust in people and birth cohorts. The
vertical axis denotes the proportion of people who claim that “most people
can be trusted”. For birth cohorts 1952–1963, the proportions are quite stable.
The linear trends and 95% confidence intervals are fitted within the optimal
bandwidths on the two sides of the cutoff separately. There is no remarkable
discontinuity at the cutoff in the proportion of trust in people.
Table 3.3 displays the 2SLS estimation results of the effects of education
on trust in people. Across all of the 6 columns, the magnitudes of estimated
coefficients range between 0.12 and 0.17. The magnitudes are not negligible
if we compare them to the mean, which is about 0.46. However, none of the
estimates are significantly different from 0 at the 10% significance level.
For comparison, Table 3.4 shows the OLS estimation results, in which the
control variables are exactly the same as that in Table 3.3. Across all of the
columns, the estimated coefficients range between 0.07 and 0.08, and they are
all significant at the 1% significance level. This suggests one additional year of
schooling is associated with a 8 percentage points increase in the probability
of trust in people.
Now we check the robustness of the effects by varying the bandwidths.
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In Table 3.A3, in column (1), the baseline bandwidth 6 years is used for
comparison. From column (2) to column (5), the bandwidths adopted are 9, 8,
7, and 5 respectively. Across all of the five regressions, none of the estimated
effects are statistically significant, and the magnitudes range between -0.06
and 0.14. The 2SLS estimates do not support that education has positive and
robust effects on trust in people.
Trust in politicians
Now we investigate the effect of education on trust in politicians. Figure 3.6
shows the relationship between trust in politicians and the birth cohorts. For
birth cohorts 1952–1963, the proportions of people who trust in politicians
range between 0.43 and 0.52. The linear trends and 95% confidence intervals
are fitted within the optimal bandwidth on either side of the cutoff. There is
no evident discontinuity at the cutoff for the linear fits, and the 95% confidence
intervals overlap at the cutoff.
Table 3.5 shows the 2SLS estimation results from regressing trust in politi-
cians on educational attainment and other control variables, with educational
attainment instrumented by the “law change” dummy. Across all of the
columns, none of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 10% sig-
nificance level, and the magnitudes range from -0.03 to -0.01. The results do
not suggest any significant effect of education on trust in politicians.
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For comparison, Table 3.6 displays the OLS estimation results. For all
of the six regressions, the estimated coefficients are all significant at the 1%
significance level, and the magnitudes are around 0.04, indicating one addi-
tional year of schooling is associated with a 4 percentage points increase in the
probability of trusting politicians.
Lastly, we check the robustness of results by varying the bandwidths. The
results are shown in Table 3.A4. For all of the regressions, the estimated
effects vary from -0.03 to 0.01, and none of the estimates are significant at 10
% significance level. Thus, the results here do not suggest that education has
positive and robust effects on trust in the politicians.
Trust in government
Now we explore the effects of education on trust in the government. Figure
3.7 shows the relationship between trust in government and the birth cohorts.
For the cohorts born between 1952 and 1963, the proportions of people who
trust in government range from 0.70 to 0.76. Linear fits and 95% confidence
intervals are plotted on either side of the cutoff. It shows that there is no
evident discontinuity at the cutoff, and the confidence intervals overlap with
each other at the cutoff.
Table 3.7 shows the RD estimation results of education effects on the trust
in government. Across all of the columns, the estimated coefficients are in-
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significant, and the magnitudes range between minus 0.03 and 0.06. The
results do not suggest that more schooling improves trust in government.
For comparison, the OLS estimation results are reported in Table 3.8. In
all of the 6 columns, the estimated coefficients are all significant at the 1%
significance level, and the magnitudes are all around 0.04. The results imply
that one additional year of schooling is associated with a 4 percentage points
increase in the probability of trust in government.
To check the sensitivity to the selection of bandwidths, we change the
bandwidths around the optimal bandwidth. The results are reported in Table
3.A5. Across all of the regressions, none of the effects are significant at 10%
significance level, and the magnitudes range from -0.07 to -0.01. To summarize,
the results do not support that education has positive and robust effects on
trust in government.
3.5.3 Additional check
To further check the relationship between educational level and the levels of
trust, the average years of schooling, average levels of trust in people, trust in
government, and trust in politicians are plotted for birth cohorts 1925–1975
in Figure 3.8. We find that the proportions of trust in people, government,
and politicians do not fluctuate much for the cohorts born between 1925 and
1975. Specifically, the levels of trust in people fluctuate around 0.45, with a
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standard deviation of 0.03. The levels of trust in the government vary around
0.74, with a standard deviation of 0.02. The levels of trust in politicians
fluctuate around 0.46, with a standard deviation of 0.03. These facts imply
the social trust has almost remained the same level during this period, without
any significant declining or ascending trend. This pattern is in contrast with
the sharp decline of social trust in the US, as documented by Putnam (1995).
Besides, the average education level has increased steadily for the cohorts
born between 1925 and 1975, as shown in Figure 3.8. The average years of
schooling have increased from 10.5 to 12.5 (mean 11.5, standard deviation
0.52). If more schooling indeed encourages (discourages) individuals to trust
in people, government, or politicians, we should observe a corresponding in-
crease (decrease) in the level of trust in people, government, or politicians.
Unfortunately, there is no remarkable increase (decrease) in the level of trust,
as shown in Figure 3.8.
3.6 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter investigates the effect of education on generalised trust and po-
litical trust in the UK, by exploiting the exogenous variation in schooling
caused by the increase in school leaving age in 1972. This study finds that
the new compulsory schooling law in 1972 increased the years of schooling by
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about 0.25 years. In the RD estimation, the effects of education on three trust
measures—trust in people, trust in politicians, and trust in government, are
all statistically insignificant. By contrast, in the OLS estimations, education
and all of the three trust measures are positively and significantly correlated.
These findings imply that the OLS estimates may suffer from omitted vari-
able bias and education may not necessarily foster trust. The findings are in
contrast to those of Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011), which documents that
schooling might foster trust. Of course, our 2SLS estimates capture the effects
on the compliers, so we cannot exclude the possibility that education has an
impact on trust of the non-compliers.
This study is also related to the papers exploring the effect of education
on social participation, since trust and civic participation are positively cor-
related (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Hence, it is helpful to compare the
results in this chapter with those of the studies focusing on civic participation.
Milligan et al. (2004) investigate the effect of education on voting participa-
tion. Although they find a strong relationship between education and voting
participation in the US, they fail to find a significant relationship in the UK.
They also examine the effect of education on trust in people and federal gov-
ernment in the US. In their IV estimations, the estimated coefficient for trust
in people is only significant at the 10% significance level, and that for trust
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in government is insignificant at the 10% significance level. So our estimation
results are comparable to those of Milligan et al. (2004).
In the literature, education is considered one of the most important pre-
dictors of trust and social capital (Helliwell and Putnam, 2007; Nannestad,
2008; Borgonovi, 2012). For example, Helliwell and Putnam (2007) find that
personal education and the average education in the region are positively corre-
lated with trust, and they indicate that increase in own-education and average
education would lead to an increase in social trust. However, most of these
studies adopt OLS estimations, which cannot generate reliable causal infer-
ence in this field. Because for the OLS estimations, there may be three levels
of unobservables which are correlated with both educational attainment and
trust: individual intelligence, family background, and community level char-
acteristics. If we assume the omitted variable is positively correlated with
educational attainment and trust, the OLS estimates may be upward biased.
Indeed, in contrast to the significant OLS estimates, none of the RD estimates
are statistically significant in this chapter. The difference between OLS and
RD estimates implies that researchers might need to interpret the relationship
between education and trust with caution. It is possible that the positive cor-
relation between education and trust only reveals the fact that individuals with
higher intelligence, born in better families, or growing up in richer communi-
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ties obtain more schooling and express more trust in others and government
as well. As indicated by the RD estimates, when people are forced to obtain
more schooling, their level of trust does not increase correspondingly. Hence,
increasing the years of schooling may not be an efficient way to improve the
level of social trust.
Actually, it is possible that more schooling reduces trust in others. If people
tend to protect themselves from undesirable realities, people in higher positions
of the society may place less trust in others.10 Consistent with this argument,
Schilke et al. (2015) find that in the social exchange games, subjects with more
power exhibit less perceptual and behavioral trust in others. As discussed
above, education can improve people’s earnings and socioeconomic status, i.e.,
more schooling may put people in more powerful positions in society. So, in the
light of the findings of Schilke et al. (2015), it is possible that more schooling
decreases trust in others. In addition, if education makes the citizens more
critical, they may express less trust in politicians or government. As argued by
Hooghe (2011), in well-established democracies, we do expect that there are
critical citizens who display some kind of distrust in politicians. The critiques
from the citizens are indispensable to make sure that the political institutions
10In the literature, social status is positively correlated with trust. However, this does
not necessarily mean social status has a positive effect on trust, because the social status
may be endogenous in this situation.
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are functioning in the right way. Hence, more schooling may not necessarily
increase generalized or political trust. More studies are needed to investigate
the relationship between education, social status (power), and trust.
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Figure 3.1: Effects of the 1972 compulsory schooling law
Notes: The horizontal axis represents the year of birth. From bottom to top, the three
lines represent the proportions of leaving school by age 15, 16, and 17 respectively.
Each dot represents the year-of-birth cohort mean. The first affected cohort , born
in 1958, is denoted by the vertical line (cutoff).
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Figure 3.2: Balancing check
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects
who were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the sample. The first affected
cohort, born in 1958, is denoted by the vertical line (cutoff). The top left panel
checks whether there is a discontinuity at the cutoff in the proportion of females; the
top right panel checks whether there is a discontinuity in the proportion of asian;
the lower left panel checks the proportion of black; the lower right panel checks the
age at the survey.
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Figure 3.3: Density of the assignment variable
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects
who were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the sample. The first affected
cohort, born in 1958, is denoted by the vertical line (cutoff).
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Figure 3.4: Impacts of the law change on educational attainment
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects
who were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the sample. The first affected
cohort, born in 1958, is denoted by the vertical line (cutoff). The fitted values of the
local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence intervals, are plotted within the
chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the cohort mean.
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Figure 3.5: Effects of education on trust in people
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects
who were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the sample. The first affected
cohort, born in 1958, is denoted by the vertical line (cutoff). The fitted values of the
local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence intervals, are plotted within the
chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the cohort mean.
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Figure 3.6: Effects of education on trust in politicians
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects
who were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the sample. The first affected
cohort, born in 1958, is denoted by the vertical line (cutoff). The fitted values of the
local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence intervals, are plotted within the
chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the cohort mean.
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Figure 3.7: Effects of education on trust in government
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects
who were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the sample. The first affected
cohort, born in 1958, is denoted by the vertical line (cutoff). The fitted values of the
local linear regressions, as well as 95% confidence intervals, are plotted within the
chosen bandwidths. Each dot represents the cohort mean.
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Figure 3.8: The levels of trust and education: birth cohorts 1925–1975
Notes: The data is from British Social Attitudes Survey 1983-2013. Subjects who
were born between 1925 and 1975 are included in the sample. The first affected
cohort, born in 1958, is denoted by the vertical line (cutoff). There are two vertical
axes: the left vertical axis denotes the proportions of subjects who trust in the people,
the government, and politicians respectively; and the right vertical axis denotes the
average years of schooling for each cohort.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
People can be trusted 5,231 0.463 0.499 0 1
Trust in politicians 4,762 0.471 0.499 0 1
Trust in government 5,632 0.733 0.442 0 1
Years of schooling 7,335 11.76 1.449 10 14
Law change 7,335 0.540 0.498 0 1
Female 7,335 0.545 0.498 0 1
Age 7,335 44.55 7.542 23 61
Asian 7,335 0.0322 0.176 0 1
Black 7,335 0.0267 0.161 0 1
England 7,335 0.854 0.353 0 1
Scotland 7,335 0.0941 0.292 0 1
Year of birth 7,335 1,958 3.454 1952 1963
Survey year 7,335 2,002 6.699 1986 2013
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics for the sample
used in the baseline estimation. The optimal bandwidth chosen
according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who were born between
1952 and 1963 are included in the sample.
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Table 3.2: Effects of compulsory law change on educational attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Years of schooling
Law change 0.2658*** 0.2657*** 0.2643*** 0.2444*** 0.2414*** 0.2464***
(0.0670) (0.0670) (0.0658) (0.0613) (0.0607) (0.0591)
Female 0.0019 0.0014 0.0110 0.0107 0.0131
(0.0226) (0.0231) (0.0226) (0.0222) (0.0223)
Age 0.0453** 0.0397* 0.0401* 0.0667
(0.0204) (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0413)
Age squared -0.0005* -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0007
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Asian 0.9644*** 0.9554*** 0.9598***
(0.1473) (0.1459) (0.1502)






Survey year No No No No No Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,335 7,335 7,335 7,335 7,335 7,335
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who were born
between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regressions. “Law change” is a dummy, which equals
1 if the individual is subject to the new compulsory schooling law. Cohort trend includes the
assignment variable Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy
T. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***,
p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.3: Effects of education on trust in people (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Trust in people
Years of schooling 0.1207 0.1343 0.1448 0.1624 0.1651 0.1439
(0.0959) (0.1000) (0.1014) (0.1110) (0.1120) (0.1035)
Female -0.0552*** -0.0551*** -0.0543*** -0.0540*** -0.0536***
(0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0088)
Age 0.0308 0.0286 0.0285 0.0107
(0.0199) (0.0209) (0.0211) (0.0172)
Age squared -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Asian -0.2087* -0.2071* -0.1810*
(0.1142) (0.1152) (0.1070)






Survey year No No No No No Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,231 5,231 5,231 5,231 5,231 5,231
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who were born between
1952 and 1963 are included in the regressions. Cohort trend includes the assignment variable Z (year-
of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at
the year-of-birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.4: Association between education and trust in people (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Trust in people
Years of schooling 0.0730*** 0.0731*** 0.0734*** 0.0761*** 0.0763*** 0.0774***
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0051)
Female -0.0546*** -0.0540*** -0.0524*** -0.0520*** -0.0520***
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0101)
Age 0.0232 0.0229 0.0228 0.0009
(0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0101)
Age squared -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Asian -0.1269*** -0.1234*** -0.1156***
(0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0355)






Survey year No No No No No Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,231 5,231 5,231 5,231 5,231 5,231
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who were born between
1952 and 1963 are included in the regressions. Cohort trend includes the assignment variable Z (year-of-
birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the
year-of-birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.5: Effects of education on trust in politicians (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Trust in politicians
Years of schooling -0.0122 -0.0130 -0.0084 -0.0187 -0.0202 -0.0304
(0.0863) (0.0859) (0.0856) (0.0934) (0.0961) (0.0920)
Female 0.0041 0.0032 0.0059 0.0057 0.0079
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0189)
Age -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0010 0.0178
(0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0185)
Age squared -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Asian 0.1115 0.1105 0.1252
(0.0944) (0.0956) (0.0933)






Survey year No No No No No Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,762
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who
were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regressions. Cohort trend includes
the assignment variable Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change”
dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-birth cohort level. Significance
levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: Association between education and trust in politicians (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Trust in politicians
Years of schooling 0.0445*** 0.0445*** 0.0441*** 0.0441*** 0.0439*** 0.0441***
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Female 0.0017 0.0008 0.0021 0.0019 0.0035
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Age -0.0071 -0.0075 -0.0073 0.0050
(0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0156)
Age squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Asian 0.0448 0.0432 0.0487*
(0.0271) (0.0260) (0.0262)






Survey year No No No No No Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,762
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who were born
between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regressions. Cohort trend includes the assignment variable
Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors are
clustered at the year-of-birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.7: Effects of education on trust in government (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Trust in government
Years of schooling -0.0583 -0.0599 -0.0254 -0.0353 -0.0355 -0.0534
(0.0396) (0.0388) (0.0430) (0.0491) (0.0515) (0.0489)
Female 0.0084 0.0058 0.0081 0.0081 0.0082
(0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0139)
Age -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0042 0.0082
(0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0088)
Age squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Asian 0.1288*** 0.1276** 0.1532***
(0.0495) (0.0505) (0.0489)






Survey year No No No No No Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who were born
between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regressions. Cohort trend includes the assignment
variable Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard
errors are clustered at the year-of-birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **,
p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.8: Association between education and trust in government (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Trust in government
Years of schooling 0.0397*** 0.0396*** 0.0391*** 0.0387*** 0.0388*** 0.0410***
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Female 0.0059 0.0038 0.0048 0.0047 0.0043
(0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0115)
Age -0.0124** -0.0122** -0.0122** -0.0003
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0101)
Age squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Asian 0.0478 0.0471 0.0562*
(0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0332)






Survey year No No No No No Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who were born
between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regressions. Cohort trend includes the assignment variable
Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors are
clustered at the year-of-birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.A1: Survey waves and the number of observations in the baseline
estimation
Number of observations
Survey years Age left school Trust in people Trust in politicians Trust in government
1986 334 0 0 334
1987 315 0 0 315
1994 237 0 236 235
1996 259 0 259 256
1997 296 292 291 290
1998 444 441 440 439
2000 496 493 492 491
2001 241 0 0 241
2002 458 454 457 456
2003 686 0 684 678
2004 182 182 0 0
2005 649 642 647 642
2006 209 207 207 207
2007 820 818 206 207
2008 863 863 0 0
2009 242 238 240 238
2010 181 181 180 180
2012 206 203 206 206
2013 217 217 217 217
Total 7335 5231 4762 5632
Notes: The table shows the survey waves used in the baseline estimation and the number of observa-
tions for the main variables. The number of observations is 0 in some cases, because the trust question
was not asked in the survey.
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Table 3.A2: Effects of law change on educational attainment, robustness test
(2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bandwidths (years) 6 9 8 7 5
VARIABLES Years of schooling
Law change 0.2464*** 0.1564** 0.1927*** 0.2264*** 0.2182***
(0.0591) (0.0682) (0.0570) (0.0561) (0.0625)
Female 0.0131 0.0237 0.0186 -0.0052 0.0186
(0.0223) (0.0257) (0.0289) (0.0233) (0.0261)
Age 0.0667 0.0584*** 0.0631*** 0.0596** 0.0136
(0.0413) (0.0167) (0.0179) (0.0256) (0.0406)
Age squared -0.0007 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006* -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Asian 0.9598*** 1.0050*** 1.0389*** 1.0075*** 1.0022***
(0.1502) (0.1069) (0.1222) (0.1349) (0.1771)
Black 0.3562*** 0.4177*** 0.3743*** 0.4034*** 0.3586***
(0.0818) (0.0913) (0.0865) (0.0866) (0.0786)
England 0.1374** 0.0872 0.0671 0.1024 0.1627**
(0.0556) (0.0588) (0.0640) (0.0629) (0.0619)
Scotland 0.1108 0.0194 0.0127 0.0585 0.1231
(0.0940) (0.0810) (0.0940) (0.0986) (0.1116)
Survey year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,335 11,174 9,862 8,605 6,114
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who
were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regression (1). In regressions (2)
to (5), the bandwidths used are 9, 8, 7, and 5 years respectively. Cohort trend includes
the assignment variable Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change”
dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-birth cohort level. Significance levels
are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.A3: Effects of education on trust in people, robustness test (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bandwidths (years) 6 9 8 7 5
VARIABLES Trust in people
Years of schooling 0.1439 0.0832 0.1268 0.0893 -0.0556
(0.1035) (0.0835) (0.0862) (0.1033) (0.0676)
Female -0.0536*** -0.0532*** -0.0477*** -0.0491*** -0.0545***
(0.0088) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0119) (0.0105)
Age 0.0107 0.0216 -0.0004 0.0185 -0.0004
(0.0172) (0.0155) (0.0129) (0.0117) (0.0198)
Age squared 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Asian -0.1810* -0.1339 -0.1826* -0.1331 0.0247
(0.1070) (0.0940) (0.0990) (0.1060) (0.0821)
Black -0.2382*** -0.2274*** -0.2383*** -0.2389*** -0.1742***
(0.0598) (0.0488) (0.0580) (0.0557) (0.0377)
England -0.0277 0.0243 -0.0070 0.0345 -0.0219
(0.0399) (0.0378) (0.0373) (0.0333) (0.0406)
Scotland 0.0030 0.0631 0.0299 0.0700** 0.0033
(0.0350) (0.0387) (0.0347) (0.0343) (0.0433)
Survey year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,231 7,008 6,114 7,951 4,340
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who were
born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regression (1). In regressions (2) to (5), the
bandwidths used are 9, 8, 7, and 5 years respectively. Cohort trend includes the assignment
variable Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the “law change” dummy T. Standard
errors are clustered at the year-of-birth cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **,
p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.A4: Effects of education on trust in politicians, robustness test (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bandwidths (years) 6 9 8 7 5
VARIABLES Trust in politicians
Years of schooling -0.0304 -0.0055 -0.0181 -0.0066 0.0136
(0.0920) (0.1057) (0.0971) (0.1129) (0.1182)
Female 0.0079 0.0039 0.0031 0.0106 0.0132
(0.0189) (0.0144) (0.0169) (0.0136) (0.0225)
Age 0.0178 0.0149 0.0081 0.0091 0.0371**
(0.0185) (0.0123) (0.0170) (0.0104) (0.0176)
Age squared -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003**
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Asian 0.1252 0.0927 0.1069 0.1052 0.0913
(0.0933) (0.1164) (0.1022) (0.1188) (0.1275)
Black -0.0554 -0.0793* -0.0694 -0.0574 -0.0748
(0.0533) (0.0463) (0.0456) (0.0595) (0.0713)
England -0.0061 -0.0110 -0.0186 -0.0184 -0.0097
(0.0351) (0.0277) (0.0297) (0.0269) (0.0416)
Scotland -0.0442 -0.0319 -0.0541** -0.0316 -0.0441
(0.0312) (0.0290) (0.0260) (0.0283) (0.0343)
Survey year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,762 6,469 5,630 7,327 3,987
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects
who were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regression (1). In regres-
sions (2) to (5), the bandwidths used are 9, 8, 7, and 5 years respectively. Cohort
trend includes the assignment variable Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction
with the “law change” dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-birth
cohort level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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Table 3.A5: Effects of education on trust in government, robustness test
(2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bandwidths (years) 6 9 8 7 5
VARIABLES Trust in government
Years of schooling -0.0534 -0.0302 -0.0598 -0.0098 -0.0715
(0.0489) (0.0680) (0.0571) (0.0796) (0.0711)
Female 0.0082 0.0080 0.0046 0.0040 0.0086
(0.0139) (0.0115) (0.0126) (0.0106) (0.0157)
Age 0.0082 0.0079 0.0054 0.0008 0.0103
(0.0088) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0147)
Age squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Asian 0.1532*** 0.1342* 0.1689*** 0.1198 0.1811**
(0.0489) (0.0714) (0.0573) (0.0796) (0.0751)
Black 0.0038 -0.0171 0.0062 -0.0200 -0.0009
(0.0492) (0.0514) (0.0493) (0.0589) (0.0569)
England -0.0109 -0.0079 -0.0063 -0.0144 -0.0004
(0.0217) (0.0172) (0.0195) (0.0151) (0.0246)
Scotland -0.0395 -0.0384 -0.0437* -0.0376 -0.0366
(0.0243) (0.0256) (0.0227) (0.0232) (0.0260)
Survey year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,632 7,621 6,660 8,621 4,713
Notes: The optimal bandwidth chosen according to CCT (2014) is 6, so subjects who
were born between 1952 and 1963 are included in the regression (1). In regressions
(2) to (5), the bandwidths used are 9, 8, 7, and 5 years respectively. Cohort trend
includes the assignment variable Z (year-of-birth cohort) and its interaction with the
“law change” dummy T. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-birth cohort
level. Significance levels are: ***, p<0.01; **, p<0.05; *, p<0.1.
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